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NEW DIRECTIONS FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: SOME THOUGHTS FOR MACROMODELING

by Robert D. Crane

NEVER before in history, it seems, have we as a nation faced so many problems. Despite enormous resources devoted to solving them, they continue to grow in number and complexity. The basic problem is the simple process of rapid change, because it vitally affects all other problem-solving efforts. In the modern age, a solution that appears to be workable at the moment it is conceived may well be outdated and impractical by the time it is applied: more likely than not, the situation will have changed. If we adopt a static approach and try to apply past solutions that in most cases are inappropriate for our present and future needs, we may be overwhelmed by the challenge of a changing world. Our thinking must be flexible and anticipatory so that we can cope with fast-moving global developments.

A second problem is the difficulty the practicing statesman encounters in relating the interests and ideals of his country to the changing foreign policy scene. Every individual has selfish interests and unselfish ideals which serve as substantive premises for action. Human affairs can be defined as the shifting relationship of conflict and convergence between one set of interests and ideals and another set or sets. In addition, every individual has definite, if sometimes unconscious, ideas on how best to achieve his interests and ideals. These ideas serve as basic methodological premises for action. In the international arena the same holds true, but the actors are groups of people who have achieved nation-statehood or wish to do so. International politics can be reduced analytically to the interaction of more than two dozen basic substantive and methodological premises among different national actors. One task of the foreign-policy maker in a
democratic country is to understand these premises underlying the group-thinking of his country and to make policy in accordance with them.

By way of illustration, it is clear that one of the most important premises motivating the United States, the Soviet Union, and every other country is the need for at least a minimum degree of global stability. In the modern world of advanced weapons this is essential if each is to preserve its national existence. Stability as a foreign policy premise, however, takes practical meaning only in conjunction with other premises. Although both the United States and the Soviet Union share an equal interest in a minimum stability, the need for it is more important for the United States. This is true because American leaders, more than their Soviet counterparts, have been brought up to regard stability not only as a requirement of self-interest, but as an unselfish ideal and a means to achieve other ideals.

Stability in the sense of an absence of conflict is a self-evident good in the American scale of values. It is also a methodological prerequisite to achieve other ultimate values. American foreign policy is based on the belief that progress in promoting human welfare is inseparable from progress in conflict resolution. Conflict resolution, and the stability resulting from it, therefore are basic methodological premises of all American foreign policy thinking. Although U.S. strategists have developed a passion for the military superiority thought to be necessary for crisis control, the latter is considered to be merely a necessary means to stability and conflict resolution.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, bases much of its foreign policy on the contrary premise that all progress results from dialectical conflict, no matter what the sphere of activity. Real progress in promoting human welfare can come, therefore, only from Soviet superiority in managing such conflict. Although they have been educated by Western strategists to appreciate the importance of crisis control, the Soviets believe that facility in the orchestration of crises is merely a minor requirement for success in the vital international business of long-range political conflict management.

During the short but traumatic age of nucleophobia, when fear of nuclear weapons dominated the foreign policy of every major nation, many policy intellectuals elevated the control of conflict, encompassing either its resolution or its management or both, into an overarching framework of analysis. Other premises, both teleological or goal-oriented as well as methodological, became dependent variables in a macromodel limited to the goals and requirements of stability.

The unprecedented challenges of a rapidly changing and interacting global society, which threatened the traditional identity and even the physical survival of many of its members, produced an obsession for "law and order." Many positive goals relating to progress in improving men’s social, economic and political environment remained important. But the principal independent variable was stability. The name of the game was not progress with maximum feasible stability, but stability with whatever progress was consistent with it. Caught in such a weighted and inflexible framework of analysis, many policymakers drifted into an open-ended commitment to preserve the status quo even in the middle of systemic revolution. This in turn created pressures to militarize American responses to foreign policy challenges.

The inevitable failures of such an approach to foreign policy have created pressures to systematize the policy process so that statesmen at all levels will have constantly available a rich mixture of basic premises and pertinent factual analysis. A macromodel specifically designed to maintain flexibility must provide whatever is needed to control short-run international crises at various levels of the conflict spectrum. But the overriding objective should be to provide systematic background research and analytical planning for a foreign policy, as well as a domestic policy, geared not primarily to the security of man but to the dignity of men. One of the most important by-products — and it should remain a by-product, not an independent goal — might be a significant demilitarization of America's role in the world community.

The ultimate objective of such a macromodel would be to systematize and improve the process of foreign policymaking. The model can be structured so that the data collection and analysis in the middle of this process can be quantified for computerization. The beginning of the process, when the task is the formulation of information requirements, is less susceptible to quantification. And the crucial terminal phase, consisting in actual policy
formulation, is essentially unquantifiable because it depends so heavily on intangibles susceptible only to human judgment.

The most important of these intangibles, the basic premises underlying foreign policy judgments, cannot be effectively quantified. But they at least can be treated systematically. A separate macromodel can be designed to bring to bear on each policy problem and opportunity, in a systematic and balanced way, this non-quantifiable dimension of policymaking. The application of such a model to specific problems could serve not only to improve the judgment reached at the end of the policy process, but to clarify the information requirements at its beginning.

The first requirement for modeling basic premises is to recognize that they exist. The conscious or unconscious development of a uni-premise foreign policy, no matter how legitimate the premise may be, is a sure road to policy failure. Conversely, wisdom in the formulation and execution of foreign policy depends on maintaining in balance a rich mixture of many premises. American policy toward every area of the world and every functional issue should be rethought periodically to determine whether it is consistent with our basic premises both in concept and execution. Although a high degree of consistency between policies and premises is rarely possible, the goal of absolute consistency should be periodically measured in every area of U.S. foreign policy concern.

The object of this article is to select an important but little appreciated basic premise and to point out two of the many new policy perspectives that might result from giving it more weight in the foreign policy process. This basic premise is pluralism: the right of diverse peoples to develop their unique identities. Somewhat as a lawyer would in a court of law, the article advocates the case for pluralism as an important postulate for U.S. policy toward the Third World of Asia and Africa and toward Europe. A balanced weighting of this premise with others equally important would lead to substantial modifications in the foreign policies suggested here. The intention is not to advocate specific policies, but to suggest that the manipulation of basic premises in a systematic way and their application iteratively to the foreign policy process can provide additional perspective on the alternatives available in mid-range and long-range foreign policy planning. Such an exercise in "presearch," if augmented by critical research, might also help to clarify what our interests and ideals are.

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Pluralism: A Key to Peace and Progress in the Third World?

The primary determinant of postwar international politics, as seen through American eyes, has been the Soviet Union's threat to expand its influence over world affairs, and the attempt by the United States to prevent this. In this situation, the absence of other substantial centers of noncommunist power and influence forced the steady expansion of American commitments. Perhaps the biggest change in world affairs during the next ten years will be a reversal of this process, to the benefit of the United States. American and Soviet policy will no longer dominate the global environment. Rather, the global environment will be the primary determinant of American policy and the primary restraint on reactionary communism. In order to prevent an American retreat into isolationism resulting from her frustrations in molding the world environment, the United States therefore should promote those forces that support her basic interests without conscious American direction. The most important such force is global pluralism.

Three critical relationships will express American response to the forces of global pluralism and American influence on these forces. Each of these relationships will exercise a strong influence on the other two. The first is between the United States and the Soviet Union, specifically between the forces on either side which can transform their relationship from confrontation into negotiation. The second is between the United States and Europe, specifically between the United States and the European forces trending toward a new internationalism based on intra- and inter-regional cooperation.

The third important relationship in American foreign policy is between the United States and the forces for modernization and conflict among the peoples of the Third World. In a sense this one is the most important of the three, because American policymakers seem to have had a poorer understanding of Third World dynamics than they have had of developments in the Soviet Union and Europe. U.S. relations with the Third World take on added importance because the likelihood of serious policy errors is greater here than in any other region of the world.

The three main causes of conflict in the Third World are external communist exploitation of indigenous frustrations, the failure of local governments to meet the just social and economic
demands of their increasingly enlightened peoples, and the attempts of essentially artificial states to maintain order by imposing centralized institutions on their multinational populations.

The Viet Nam war is a classic illustration of the potential of externally engineered communist global revolution to aggravate local conflict. It has stressed to us the importance of understanding the complexities of Asian and African development. But Viet Nam has also presented favorable opportunities for communist revolutionaries, and polycentric competition within the communist camp has fueled their efforts. Consequently, the conflict has impeded proper understanding of the range and subtlety of problems facing U.S. policy in the Third World. The unavoidable focus of American attention on Viet Nam has led many people to conclude that external communist conflict management, and particularly communist supply of armaments, poses the greatest threat to peace and welfare in the developing areas. U.S. policy can succeed in promoting the freedom of a pluralist world only when we recognize that in the Third World as a whole, global communism poses a relatively minor and probably decreasing threat to the well-being of the peoples.

The second type of conflict confronting U.S. policy toward the Third World is best illustrated by the failures and successes of socio-economic reform in Latin America. This region is unusually free of external communist aggression, chiefly because communist strategists have misjudged the subjective potential of revolution in specific areas, and because a stalemate among conflicting communist factions has undermined their collective ability to exploit whatever potential does exist. Latin America therefore presents in its purest form a conflict environment shaped primarily by the disparity between the great possibilities for regional economic progress and the widespread social injustice and poverty impeding this progress.

Latin America will provide the most favorable laboratory for testing the theory, advanced by the President of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, that conflict in the Third World is a simple product of economic backwardness, and that conversely “in a modernizing society security means development.” There is a great temptation to project American managerial concepts to the solution of Third World problems, in the belief that organization will provide the elixir of peace and progress. In his book, *The Essence of Security*, McNamara summarizes this theory:

The irreducible fact remains that our security is related directly to the security of the newly developing world, and our role must be precisely this, to help provide security to those developing nations. . . . If security implies anything, it implies a minimal measure of order and stability. . . . Law and order is the shield behind which development, the central fact of security, can be achieved. . . . When the people of a nation have organized their own human and natural resources . . . then their resistance to disorder and violence will enormously increase. . . . We must help the developing nation with such training and equipment as are necessary to maintain the protective shield behind which development can go forward. \(^3\)

The theory receives superficial support from conflict statistics indicating a high incidence of violence in countries of low economic status. Thus, during the past decade, the twenty-seven rich countries of the world, with per capita annual incomes above $750, have experienced a total of only one major internal conflict, whereas the thirty-eight poorest countries, with a per capita income under $100, suffered thirty-two significant conflicts, most of them of a prolonged nature. On the basis of these statistics, McNamara concludes: “There can be no question but that there is a relationship between violence and economic backwardness.” \(^9\) He postulates further that the only way to overcome violence and to promote democracy in the Third World is to introduce better management methods into poor countries, because “paradoxical as it may sound, the real threat to democracy comes not from overmanagement, but from undermanagement.” The derogatory view of decentralized pluralism inherent in this philosophy of development is underlined in McNamara’s related dictum that “vital decision-making, particularly in policy matters, must remain at the top.” \(^8\)

Such a centralist philosophy, if pursued by American foreign policy throughout Asia and Africa, could result in catastrophic unrest. This is true because the third major cause of conflict in the Third World arises from the clash between the centralizing efforts of modernizing states and the upsurge of independence among ethnic and other subordinate communal groups which want to modernize in their own way and at their own speed.

The conflict between state and community has become the dominant source of disorder throughout most of Asia and Africa, where the new states inherited large colonial administrative territories. The immediate goal of those who replaced European

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2^('Ibid., p. 115.
3^('Ibid., pp. 109-110.
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rulers was to hang on to their new power. When the European imperialists created their colonies, they paid scant attention to ethnic boundaries, carving up diverse peoples who formerly were largely independent. These same peoples today often reject their new indigenous overlords as bitterly as they did the European imperialists.

This third type of conflict is endemic only in Asia and Africa. In Latin America the Europeans were so successful, and brutal, in their colonization that they almost completely replaced indigenous cultures and political loyalties with their own. In Asia and Africa, on the other hand, the loyalties of indigenous ethnic and cultural communities or nations often survived intact throughout the period of European control. During the past two post-independence decades, the spread of education and the advent of mass communications have served to make these peoples conscious of their own unique values and the comparative deficiencies of neighboring peoples who might claim jurisdiction over them. The individual and mass alienation that everywhere has accompanied the process of secular modernization has impelled them to seek individual identity and group solidarity in communal nationalism. This fact conflicts directly with the attempts of modernization theorists to achieve greater societal efficiency by assimilating peoples into large centralized states. Centralization in turn accelerates the drive toward communal nationalism, and in some areas has triggered movements toward confederal regionalism among communal nationalists extending beyond the confines of any single state. In effect, modernization, if it implies the centralized assimilation of politically conscious communities, is not an elixir of order and security but a cause of the very instability McNamara hopes it will cure.

The drive toward self-determination of independent-minded peoples and the growth of transnational solidarity among like-minded communal groups has given rise to powerful forces of revolutionary nationalism and supranational regionalism. Unless a corresponding rise of pluralist federalism can accommodate them, they will erupt into waves of conflict which may remake the map in parts of the Third World.

The importance of these forces is indicated by the fact that of 164 internationally significant outbreaks of violence between 1958 and 1966, only fifteen were military confrontations between two states. And of these nearly 150 major internal conflicts, more than half, including the most serious ones, resulted in large measure from state/nation conflicts. The fatalities resulting directly and indirectly from such conflicts between state and nation since the end of World War II have already exceeded five million, most of them unreported. The trend toward communal nationalism and decentralization is developing so rapidly in many Afro-Asian regions that American foreign policies formulated to meet the conditions of a decade ago are now largely irrelevant. Moreover, the entire thrust of traditional American development theory supports the centralizing efforts of assimilatory "nation-building" which kindle communal nationalism and fan its growth into a powerful revolutionary force.

Since Soviet strategists share these same development theories, the emerging nations of Asia and Africa may equally oppose the United States and the Soviet Union and receive revolutionary support only from Communist China. The two superpowers may tend to disengage from direct confrontations, concentrating instead on promoting the security of their principal Third World allies against noncommunist revolution within and across their allies' borders. Although this relative disengagement would clearly be in American interests, the price in conflict and human misery for such a gain would be morally unacceptable.

If the leaders of the United States want to exert world leadership during the remainder of this century, they need only support the probably irreversible trend toward decentralized initiative and pluralist responsibility in the world. Americans can best provide global leadership simply by preaching abroad what we practice at home.

Americans are now entering a period of general reaction against the failures and limited successes of the development policies we have pursued for so long at great personal expense. If our commitment to help the peoples of Asia and Africa is not to become a casualty of this reaction, now is the time to consider whether some of the political forces we have helped to suppress and some of the economic forces we have deprecated or ignored may not have a positive potential in the development of parts of the Third World. Far from being anachronisms in a sophisticated world of mass society, the two forces of communal nationalism and local in-

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tive proportions only when modernization is taken to mean the imposition of centralized political power on an agglomeration of naturally independent nations, once administered collectively as a dependent colonial territory, and then elevated by the departing colonialists to the status of an independent but artificial state.

The assumption has become general that coercive assimilation is necessary in most of Asia and Africa for technological modernization. The time has come to question that assumption. We may find that only when policy is based on it do the traditional institutions of society become what many students of the modernization process believe them inherently to be: mere obstacles to progress and stability. We may also gain insights into the demonstrated potential of communal nationalism within a federal framework to channel the most powerful human drives into cooperative self-betterment.

Probably the best case study of the rights and wrongs in Third World development is Nigeria. The federalist approach of the traditionally decentralized Ibo people to political and economic development helped to transform Nigeria into an African showcase. Ironically, in 1966 the Ibos reacted to the natural tensions of a developing federal state by attempting to convert Nigeria from a federal into a unitary state. The perhaps inevitable result was a massacre of the Ibos, the deterioration of cooperation into civil war, and the beginning of what may turn out to be the first of a new type of genocidal war growing out of the global modernization process.

If more modernization theorists would shift the focus of their attention from the requirements of immediate industrialization to the unromantic but locally meaningful possibilities of first applying simple technology in rural development, we might see that the secrets of the most productive form of modernization lie not so much in centralized governmental programming as in the decentralized and unplanned forces of local initiative. We might then be able to listen more sympathetically to those who insist from long experience that the real task in modernization is not to marshal manpower by organizing human resources, but to release human energy by stimulating the natural entrepreneurial desire to achieve. We would then realize that modernization is not primarily a product of governmental structure, but of individual people working as members of and in the interests of a group with which they have a common sense of identity and solidarity,
whether it is in their own family or its extension in a more diffuse moral community.

Economic counterparts to political pluralism have been investigated, perhaps most creatively by Louis Kelso. He suggests linking technology with the individual through the wide diffusion of capital ownership among the world’s agricultural and industrial workers. He questions the long-range benefits of relying on financing growth through past savings, because this technique further concentrates capital ownership during an era when capital rather than labor increasingly is the producer of wealth. Instead he lists ways to finance new capital formation out of future earnings derived from the use of borrowed capital. Specifically, he recommends that at individual factories or agricultural enterprises a trust be organized to receive guaranteed loans for new tools, seeds or fertilizers. As the loan is repaid, all or most of the new "ownership" created through the use of new technology would vest in the workers who provided the labor input. Any defaults on repayment might be regarded as a relatively cheap form of foreign aid.

The objectives of such radically new methods of financing capital formation would be to give workers a stake in the success of their own rural and urban enterprises, to stimulate the development of local management capabilities, to release the full potential of technology in socially acceptable ways, to make feasible sweeping reforms of land-ownership in areas where economic considerations dictate the preservation of large farms, and to provide an administrative framework for decentralized foreign economic assistance. If adapted to the unique requirements of the various regions and peoples of the world, such economic pluralism could have a greater global impact over the next fifty years than the collectivist economics of Marxism and neo-Marxism have had during the half-century just past.

Perhaps the most hopeful sign in the Third World is an increasing recognition among its leaders, both Westernized and traditional, that the forces of political disruption and economic immobility, endemic during the past decade, have resulted in part from their failure to distinguish the process of modernization from the Western secularized models in which it has been cast. The emerging generation of leaders in Asia and Africa is demonstrating a maturity beyond that of their elders and their elders’ advisers by welcoming a resurgence of their own native cultures. They have seen the political, economic and cultural chaos that results when political leaders rapidly and unwisely reject the traditional values, customary law and social fabric of society without providing replacements acceptable to society’s members.

Most importantly, this new generation of leaders is beginning to see that their traditional cultures can serve as suitable vehicles for technological modernization. They are trying, therefore, to fill the cultural vacuum left by the Westernizing phase of the modernization process by consciously resurrecting the best from their cultures. In particular, they are trying to strengthen the institutions by which men have always been mobilized to action and those elements that promote the discipline, honesty and general cultural infrastructure necessary for modernization. Their objective is not to borrow industrialism from the West, for this has proved to be either impossible or not essential to the material or spiritual well-being of their people. They have vicariously acquired the wisdom of the rich by observing the most advanced industrial countries, whose experiences demonstrate that a high rate of material achievement does not automatically provide dignity, a sense of achievement and happiness. Their aim is to create independent cultures sufficiently strong and self-reliant to bring out the character traits latent in the individual members of society so they can apply modern technology to raise their living standards.

The most striking feature of the emerging generation of leaders in parts of Asia and Africa is a new pragmatism, well-grounded in their own moral universe, which makes them critical of rigid or magical reliance on any form of political or economic order to solve problems that often are unique to each geographic area and society. Instead, they seek the political aggregate, the method of
government and the economic methods that best can evoke the forces necessary to sustain the modernization process within a moral society.

The most important, if still tentative, result of their political experimentation is the slow transformation of their traditional nationalism, whether it be communally-based or state-based, into something greater than it has been in the past. They are experimenting with the diffusion of state sovereignty both downward and upward from the state level, so that their political loyalties can freely extend beyond the straitjacket so long imposed upon them by Western theories of state and nation. Independence from Western tutelage has given them the freedom and perspective to see the value of transcending the state system by allowing greater microregional initiative to solve problems below the state level, and by developing macroregional solutions to problems that can be solved only beyond it.

While accepting the frequent impracticality of eliminating artificial state boundaries without resort to the forces of chaos, the new generation of nationalists increasingly is looking for ways to reduce the dislocating effects of these boundaries. Their search for a new moral society has led many of them to accept the oldest society, the community or nation, as its most essential element, because rejection of the communal nation as a basic building block of political life has led in the past to pointless violence.

By acknowledging the legitimate moral suasion of the primordial communities below the level of the artificial state, and by emphasizing the advantages of conducting themselves as members of a functional community above the state level, many emerging leaders are simply ignoring the old colonial boundaries and thereby overcoming the artificial barriers they posed to modernization. The contrived state is losing significance in the Afro-Asian political spectrum. As a by-product of this development, African and Asian leaders may be able not only to ignore state boundaries but ultimately to realign them in the interests of natural political groupings above and below the state.

The new nationalism is a fragile development, as were all the historic forces that led to truly systemic revolutions in the organization of human political life. And like every systemic revolution — if such it be — this in the Third World may be accompanied by armed violence. Outside powers may attempt to exploit it in order to channel systemic change into a kind of dead end inimical to the material and spiritual growth of its individual participants. But the monolithic powers in the world may find that the independent spirit and increasing sophistication of the new leaders will thwart any such efforts at intervention. Some powers may dare to base their policy on attempts to help their Asian and African allies or would-be allies to suppress the ideative forces of justice, progress and group solidarity by preserving the status quo. These may find that they have hopelessly aligned themselves for the remainder of the century against a rising historical tide.

The seriousness of the dilemma this may pose to foreign powers interested in molding the world to their own centralist image is surpassed by the opportunity the new forces offer to imaginative foreign policies of the world’s democratic nations, which alone can truly support the new Third World nationalism in its communal and broad regional manifestations. Americans, of all peoples, should welcome the essentially pluralistic and democratic nature of community-oriented or “nation-based” nationalism, and should encourage the new nationalism to move in the direction of political federalism and toward the peace and material progress it can help make possible.\(^8\)

**Pluralism: A Basis for Partnership with an Independent Europe?**

The second of the three critical relationships which point up the importance of pluralism as a foreign policy premise is that between the United States and Europe. A stated premise of American foreign policy, at least since President Kennedy’s call on July 4, 1962 for a new era of transatlantic relations, has been the American desire to work toward a true partnership with Europe. The United States has insisted, however, that partnership can become an operational policy premise only after the Europeans achieve political integration and economic strength more nearly comparable to those of the United States. U.S. insistence that the Europeans reform themselves to fit the American model created a paradox between our stated premise and our operational policy.

Instead of following policies that would promote the conditions we ourselves had laid down, we undermined whatever incentives the Europeans had to form a closer union. Our economic policies toward Europe have been dominated by our belief that Europeans are inferior to us in the management techniques and mass education necessary for broad economic progress, and by our related but illogical belief that we therefore would have little to gain from partnership with the Europeans in expanding mankind's technological horizons.

American political policies toward Europe have been dominated by an unspoken fear that the Europeans are too irresponsible to be trusted with their own military defense, and by our more outspoken desire to impose on the Europeans a strategy geared to our own requirements of global arms control. These fears and desires in turn are based on the outdated belief that the military and technical requirements of strategic command and control in a bipolar world permit only two centers of decision-making, in Washington and Moscow.

American military policies toward Europe have been dominated by the notion that the challenge to Europe lies primarily in the threat of a conventional Soviet military invasion. Many Europeans familiar with Soviet thinking are convinced that the really long-run challenge to both Europe and America, which NATO has failed to face, is primarily technological. One of the most profound but little perceived dangers has been the almost universal faith among Soviet leaders in the long-range dialectical processes of scientific and technological development gives the Soviets an asymmetrically favorable environment for advanced research and development. If the environment were favorable enough, the Soviets might overtake Western capabilities in advanced weapons and impose their will on Europe without major reliance on conventional arms.

As long as the Soviet Union and Europe were both weak, American attempts to monopolize strategic power and decision-making in the Atlantic Alliance could be rationally supported. These conditions no longer exist. The Soviet Union has almost reached parity with deployed American strategic military power. This alone should be no cause for concern, because U.S. deployed strategic power equal to that of the Soviets should be sufficient to protect the United States and provide for extended American deterrence to protect Europe. The real criterion of power sufficiency is relative progress in current research and development, because this determines future power. An American goal of parity in the requisites of future military power, given the intangibles of intelligence evaluation, could easily produce a degree of American inferiority sufficient to tempt an expansionist country such as the Soviet Union to adopt more aggressive policies. In this most critical of power indicators, the Soviet Union currently poses a technological threat to the United States and Europe. Unattended, this threat to surpass future American military strength could be translated some day into a political offensive against our allies and consequently against our own vital interests.

Fortunately, this revolution in the power equation between the United States and the Soviet Union has been accompanied by a revolution in European industrial and technological power and by European progress in basic scientific research. Some American experts now contend that the Europeans have already surpassed the United States in such key areas as fundamental physics. The Europeans have reached a crossroads in their development. Failure to cooperate closely among themselves and with the United States could eventually turn Europe into a technological and economic backwater. But they have reached the advanced takeoff stage where success in cooperation could transform the entire European continent. And collaboration between the United States and Europe can now begin significantly to increase the alliance's total deterrent and defensive strength at a substantial financial saving to the American taxpayer.

Administratively, such cooperation might best be accomplished through competition among private industrial firms. Competitive governmental acquisition programs would be designed not primarily to assist the Europeans or to increase alliance security, but to achieve maximum returns by both the U.S. and European governments on their mutual investments. An alliance decision to work toward an independent Europe would create enormous demands on European and American industry. U.S. industry is not about to give anything away to the Europeans. And the Europeans clearly do not want to rely on buying U.S.-produced aerospace systems, because this would invite trade deficits and an unhealthy technological gap. European industry could best gain the necessary access to American scientific and technological know-how if European governments would cooperate with the U.S. government in arranging for firms on both sides of the Atlan-
tic to share the investments, industrial efforts, returns and markets associated with the technically complex systems that the Europeans and the Americans increasingly will need.

Research, development and production of advanced weapons systems, essential to building Europe into an independent power and to maintaining the U.S. status as an independent power, can best be accomplished by expanding the area and scope of international industrial competition. Government requests for new weapons proposals would continue to be sent to American prime contractors for U.S. weapons and to their national equivalents for British, French, German and Italian weapons. But increasingly the most successful bidders might be international prime contractors. Or they might be national prime contractors with instructions to organize international consortia of associates and multinational subcontractors geared to meet technical as well as other considerations, such as balance of payments. Thus European governments might wish to acquire 75 per cent of a particular type of tactical nuclear weapon, or of a particular follow-on bomber, mobile medium-range ballistic missile, or component of a ballistic missile defense system, whereas the United States might account for only 25 per cent of the particular weapons requirement within the alliance. The prime contractors then could be instructed to organize their consortia so that 75 per cent of the industrial requirements would be undertaken by European firms, and 25 per cent by American firms.

Individual governments could subsidize their industries to create new industrial capabilities necessary to close any technological gaps evident during the initial bidding process. Eventually such subsidies should become unnecessary as government contractors find that in many fields European industrial consortia and American industrial firms can compete as equals and can afford their own technical and economic development efforts to propose and compete for new programs.

There are many advantages in employing competitive acquisition programs to shift part of the European defense burden from American to European shoulders. Maximizing private initiative and responsibility of both European and American industry and maintaining a balance of payments are the two most important. The essential point is that American cooperation with an increasingly independent Europe is administratively feasible, as well as politically, economically and militarily desirable.

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The changes in relative military power and potential among the three industrially most advanced regions of the world, and the obsolescence of many premises underlying American strategy, provide important reasons for shifting American policy toward Europe from tutelage to cooperation. Great as would be American economic and military benefits from such a shift, the political and economic benefits for the Europeans would be even greater.

The political benefits from increased European independence would consist primarily of an improved environment for sovereign European states to build a working federalism out of the existing network of supranational European functional organizations. The Europeans share a universal fear of a single sovereign federator, particularly a non-European one, such as the Soviet Union or the United States. The fear of hegemony, even by a single European nation, will probably prevent them from adopting the American type of regional federalism, in which substantial yet strictly limited sovereignty is permanently delegated to a central government. Even if Great Britain is admitted as an intra-European balancing wheel to prevent French or German hegemony, the legitimate European fear of political centralism would probably prevent the European movement from achieving more than a confederal union, in which sovereignty would be selectively delegated to perform specific functional tasks. A prime objective would be to prevent the creation of an independent German nuclear force. Many proponents of European independence believe this could be achieved if the military authority necessary for regional command and control of advanced weapons systems were delegated in specially designed ways to the supranational Western European Union.

Cooperation between the European and American federal systems within the Atlantic Alliance, as well as cooperation among the European states within their own regional system, would demonstrate that peoples differing in language, history and national loyalties can multiply their talents and resources through the pluralist technique of functional internationalism.

The most important long-range effect of American cooperation with an independent Europe might be the extension of a loose federalism throughout all of Europe from the Atlantic to the Carpathians. The Soviet Union has long promoted the idea of a concert of Europe to include the Soviet Union but exclude the United States. The present reactionary phase of Soviet com-
munism demonstrates that this is clearly incompatible with European independence, and informed leaders in both Western and Eastern Europe know it. An independent Europe must restrict its membership to Europeans, and its success in doing so will determine the extent and permanence of its independence. European independence in turn would reduce the fear of each superpower that the reduction of its own influence in Europe would increase the influence and global power of the other.

When the Soviet Union again enters a liberalizing phase in its development, as it almost inevitably must at some indeterminate date in the future, the peoples of Europe should be ready to transform the Soviet-European relationship from confrontation to cooperation. In addition to laying the foundation for such an epic development, they must build sufficient strength as an independent European regional grouping to deter any attempts of a subsequent reactionary Soviet communism to weaken or destroy such independence by the use of military force.

Pluralism: A Path from Confrontation to Negotiation

The application of pluralism in our relations with Europe and with the Third World would also help to move the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States from confrontation to negotiation. The growth of a truly independent Europe, free to choose its international partners, would help to destroy the bipolar structure of the world and replace it with a macroregional global structure probably more stable than the inherently unstable confrontation of two genuinely incompatible superpowers. By reducing these superpowers in practice to regional powers, such a reconstellation would facilitate a pluralist framework of interregional negotiation and cooperation. This shift would make possible the beginnings of truly interregional and international problem solving. And it would separate such problem solving from the overweening interests of the two superpowers, which have aggravated tensions all over the world by looking at local problems as if they were instruments of their own bipolar confrontation.

The creation of such a pluralist world of independent nations and cooperative groupings of nations not only would promote our basic long-range global interests, but would destroy more surely than any other development the expansionist opportunities and ambitions of reactionary communist leaders. While building such a pluralist world, the United States hopefully would continue its policy of peaceful engagement with all communist countries, which has been a basic premise of U.S. foreign policy. An American foreign policy founded on this combination of basic premises would encourage communist elites, not only in Eastern Europe but in the Soviet Union and even in China, to humanize communism so the people living in these states could freely support their countries’ national and international goals.

The Czechoslovak attempt to strengthen world communism by example, rather than by subversion and force, presented a far more formidable global challenge to the forces of pluralism than the totalitarian communism now resurgent in the Soviet Union. Humanized communism is still not democratic pluralism, so the challenge to pluralist societies, e.g., the United States, would continue. But the challenge would be a contest on the merits between the organizing principles of pluralism and modified collectivism. We could welcome this kind of challenge, because we could lose such a contest only if we did not deserve to win.