

# **Social Charity**

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## Introductory Talk

(Following an introduction by Father Joseph Lynch, S.M.)

Every once in a while I get impressed with the way our sins catch up with us. So now we'll make a few mistakes together! The subject that we are going to talk about today is on the frontiers of thought, so we can afford to make a few mistakes. We want to think about the subject together, rather than have me simply tell you what the subject is. In the letter of convocation that we had, there were a certain number of points outlined and today we want to talk about the notion of the social virtues, the history of the social virtues, the nature and significance of the social virtues, and social charity and the other social virtues in the practical order. We'll do that in the two discussion periods.

### Introduction to the Social Virtues

The whole series, as you know, is on the subject of social charity. Now it's rather difficult to make a three-day series out of social charity because the literature on social charity is closer to three words than three days. The first example I know of the use of social charity is in the encyclical of Pius XI, "On Restructuring Social Order," the one we know by the name *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931).

In that Encyclical Pius XI mentions the word "social charity" some eight or ten times. But all he says about it, really, is that it is the soul of social justice. So there's the literature on social charity — that it's the soul of social justice. Later, in another encyclical, "Atheistic Communism,"<sup>1</sup> without using the word "social charity," but evidently speaking about it, he gave a clue to his thought.

He said that man in society can imitate the divine perfection in ways that would not be possible for him were he to live alone.<sup>2</sup> Now that's a rather interesting thought. We know that the object of charity is always either God or the image of God. There is no other thing that can be the object of charity. God or the image of God. And it is as the image of God that we become an object of charity.<sup>3</sup>

But if what Pius XI said there is true, that man in society imitates the divine perfection in ways that would not be possible to him were he to live alone, he means that you can see society as an image of God in an altogether exclusive way, a way that does not show up anywhere else in creation. And if it's true that society is an image of God which we do not find elsewhere, then that society is worthy of love, because wherever the image of God is, in that technical sense in which we use that

phrase — possession of intellect and will — personality — then society could be an object of charity.

So Pius XI lifted the corner, if you want, on this thought. He was busy explaining social justice and only mentioned social charity because it is the soul of social justice. Without it, the role of social justice would not only be unproductive, it would be dangerous, as we are going to see later on in the series.

Now let's spend a little time trying to see what these new virtues that Pius XI mentioned, social charity and social justice, really are.

There are a great many people who think that they are just words, just like the words, for instance, "social problem." You can't give a definition to "social problem." It's kind of a blanket which would cover any number of things, but there is no question of giving a definition of it. Unfortunately, a great many people thought when Pius XI used those words, "Social justice and social charity" he was talking in those same ambiguous ways.

### **The Development of "Social Justice"**

There was a use of social justice that was fairly close to that. The word is not a new one. The word you can find going back to 1850. Its meaning as a general rule was limited to what we call nowadays, social legislation, welfare legislation. That was social justice. No idea of a scientific concept at all — simply a category, a class of legislation and of problems.

Now, when Pius XI in his encyclical "On Restructuring Social Order" used the word "social justice" and "social charity" he meant to be scientific. He was giving a real definition, so to say, real in technical name, to a virtue he wanted to discuss and which he wanted to expand. Now we have to see what social justice is before we can even think of seeing what social charity is, because it is our only key.

As I told you, the literature on social charity is what I have given you so far. So far as I know, no one has really developed the idea since. But in the doctrine of Pius XI on social justice we can see what he meant by social charity and that's what I'll be doing in this series.

Let's take social justice first then. The idea, the scientific idea, the concept of a special virtue which would have to do with the social order is as old as organized human thought. It goes back to Aristotle, but in a very primitive sort of way. Aristotle, in the fifth book of his *Ethics*, begins with a discussion of what he calls legal justice — not social justice, but legal justice.<sup>4</sup> He explains that legal justice consists of all virtues; not in themselves, but towards another. And you can see how interested he was in the subject when he goes on to say that it's not this virtue in us

that we are going to talk about. He brought it up only in order to show that he was going to talk about something else.

Now that's where it stayed for 1,500 years. There was a paragraph then on legal justice in philosophy, in morality and the most anybody did was to copy that paragraph for 1,500 years, even a little more.

The first break in a long history of neglect of this virtue came with St. Thomas Aquinas in about 1220, the 13<sup>th</sup> century. In his commentary on Aristotle, while pretending to limit himself to the text of Aristotle, he actually went beyond it. He said that this legal justice of Aristotle was not only all of virtue insofar as it refers to another, but also was a special virtue, and this is important. It was also a special virtue that had the common good for its direct object.<sup>5</sup>

Now that would make it important — the most important good that we have here on earth is our common good. And philosophers are evidently interested. But St. Thomas himself did not ask any more questions. He did not tell how social justice, which has the common good for its direct object, could be practiced. He did not tell what it looked like. He simply indicated what its end was. Its direct object was the common good and that made it very important. But he didn't say anything else about it, and no one else did for another 700 years.<sup>6</sup>

We come to a real analysis of its content in that Encyclical which I told you about, in that Encyclical which is called "On Restructuring Social Order." The act of social justice is the title of that encyclical, *restructuring the social order*. Pius XI's idea was this (we are going to move very rapidly here, but I think you will be able to get enough with our subsequent discussions) the virtues of justice and charity are always complementary.<sup>7</sup>

Charity is always the soul of justice and the reason they are complementary is that they both deal with the same value but in different ways. Both always and everywhere deal with persons, with the image of God. There is no question of justice with regard to animals or with regard to inanimate things. Justice always presupposes persons.

Now what is really involved in these two virtues of charity and justice? We can separate the two very nicely by saying that charity is the obligation we have towards the value of the human personality in itself, as the image of God. Every human person, no matter what his color, no matter what his social class, no matter what his circumstances, by the very fact that he is a person, an image of God, is worthy of our respect and our love in that theoretical and abstract sense. We often miss the idea that love can be something purely intellectual; it doesn't have to be something emotional the way it is among many.<sup>8</sup> So charity is the attitude, the duty, that we have towards human dignity, personal worth wherever it is found.

Now what is justice?<sup>9</sup> That comes because of the fact that this personal worth that we were talking about now has to be made. We are not like God. God is self-sufficient, from the beginning, from all eternity to eternity He is God. There is no such thing as development within the divine nature.<sup>10</sup> But in our particular image of God it's quite different.<sup>11</sup> When we are born we have exactly nothing to offer. In the course of our life we are supposed to come to personal perfection.

So you see we have a journey to make, we have a task to perform. I remember when we were studying psychology at Catholic University, we had a very good professor, Dr. Allers,<sup>12</sup> and he used to, once in a while, give us some very good insights into things. In trying to explain this question of human development he chose as his example a little child, three or four years old, maybe even less, who would be playing in a room and would get its mother's latest magazine and a pair of scissors. The child would go to work on the magazine with the scissors.

Now, when the mother comes in and finds that magazine scattered all over the floor with the pages not only out of sequence but unsalvageable — there is no way of putting them together again and she had a story in there which she was very interested in following — he says now when the mother comes in that room and finds that child if she spansks it, she's not a good psychologist. That little child is trying to accomplish the task of giving new form to matter. It's one of the great human tasks, and that child is trying to accomplish that human task.

The fact that it doesn't have anything to offer, that's an accident. But if it's allowed to give a new form to matter on that level, before very long it will be giving a new form to matter on a higher level. The mother may have to sympathize with her, she may have to buy another magazine. But she has to sympathize with her, because the child is developing. A good example, we all thought, of how little we have to begin with when we start our human dignity.

Our human personality can be observed only by our mothers, not even by our fathers. A father looks at a baby, he says, "Oops, maybe it will be President." But the mother sees a human person there from the beginning.

We, then, must make our personality. We must develop our image of God in us and that requires tools. We have to be able to give a new form to matter. We have to be able to make things. We have to be able to possess things. We have to have relationships which are satisfying. We have to have people who will accept us. Our mother always starts the process of course. But unless there are others added as we go along we don't develop.

So all of those tools which we use to develop our sense of worth — possessions, accomplishments, good name, love of others for us — all of those things enable us to build up our personality and to become in actuality the image of God which we were only in potentiality when we started. Now just as charity is the

attitude which we must have towards the human personality as such, as the image of God, so justice is the attitude we must have towards all these supports of human dignity — towards property, towards the friends of our family, *etc.*

If we rob another man of his friends by calumny, *etc.*, we hurt him in justice. If we run off with his wife, we hurt him in justice. Everything that enables a human personality to raise himself to an understanding of himself, to an understanding of his worth, and thus to become more an image of God, all those things that are used in life, those are all the object of justice whereas the value of the human personality itself, this great value of intelligence and will which is the image of God Himself, that is always the object of charity. Now if it is true that justice is the attitude that we must have towards every support of human personality then we come, in the vision of Pius XI, to a very important point.

### **Society and Justice**

Of all the things that we can think of which man builds his dignity on, his worth, his personality — of all the things that we can think of, society is first, most important, most extensive and most powerful in its influence. If we are members of good societies — a good family, a good neighborhood, a good city, a good nation, a good Church — if we have those societies around us and we develop in them, we have a far greater chance of becoming this image of God in actuality than we have if those societies are in any way suffering.<sup>13</sup>

Take a child who grows up in a family that is broken, where no one cares about anyone else or who grows up in a society that has been falsified as the Communists falsify society, against God, against liberty, *etc.* Immediately, once you have a society which is no longer built for human perfection, you have lost one of the greatest props, one of the greatest supports of this human personality which you must develop during life in order to become like to God.

So if society is this support of human dignity which is most necessary, which is most decisive in forming the human personality, there must be a virtue which keeps it in line, just as the virtue of individual justice keeps property in line. So there must be a virtue which keeps society in line with human perfection.<sup>14</sup> That justice is Pius XI's social justice.

In the same way in which we owe to a man his property, his good name, his friends, his loved ones — and we cannot harm him in those things — so we owe to all of our neighbors a good society and we must not harm them by disorganizing that society. If it is disorganized, we must try to rebuild it. So that the virtue with which to bring society into line with the common good, that is, into line with human perfection, that virtue is social justice. We owe it to ourselves and to others to have that society in line with human perfection.

Pius XI gave an example. First, in the encyclical “On Restructuring Social Order” itself, he is speaking of a family wage. He says that in case the particular organization of an industry wouldn’t allow this family wage, which we had always said was owed by justice-in-exchange, commutative justice as we call it. If an industry were so badly organized that it was impossible to pay a family wage — there just wasn’t enough money in it — then, of course, the employer couldn’t pay it.

But Pius XI says that if in the present state of the industry it is impossible to pay a family wage then social justice demands that changes be introduced into the industry which prevent unjust competition and make the family wage possible.<sup>15</sup>

Now I had a lot of fun with that passage when it first came out asking people what social justice demanded. Almost everybody would answer that social justice demands a family wage. See if individual justice can’t give it, then social justice gives it.

Actually that wasn’t what Pope Pius has said at all. He said that if in this given organization of the industry it is impossible to pay a family wage, then social justice demands that changes be introduced. There’s the justice — the changing of that industry, the restructuring of that industry so that it could pay a family wage. That is the object of the social justice — change — as I said, the title of the encyclical itself “On Restructuring the Social Order.”<sup>16</sup>

There’s another famous example in the Encyclical “On Atheistic Communism,” the follow-up one. Pius XI says “It happens all too frequently under the salary *system*.” You notice he’s always talking about structure. “Under the salary *system*,” he’s not talking about this pay envelope or that pay envelope, but the salary *system* — “it happens all too often that under the salary *system* that an individual employer is helpless to insure justice.”<sup>17</sup> This is the same situation as the other one.

He goes on with a little more detail: “Unless with a view to its practice he organizes institutions with other employers to prevent unjust competition and to make the practice of justice possible.” If this is true, then the employers have the duty to found, to promote, and to encourage such organizations as a normal instrument for the practices of justice, a normal instrument of the practice of individual justice. They can’t pay a good wage until the industry is fully organized. And when the industry is fully organized they can’t pay a good wage but it’s what we call a material sin: “... it happens all too frequently under the salary system that the individual employer is helpless to ensure justice.”

Now if the individual employer is helpless what can he do? Nothing! He’s finished in the individual order. So in the individual order he pays an unjust wage; but it’s a *materially* unjust wage.<sup>18</sup> He wants to pay a just wage but can’t. So he pays what he can. It’s materially unjust — he won’t go to hell, but all the workers

go to the poorhouse! In the individual order it's finished. As St. Thomas explained, no one is held to that which is impossible.<sup>19</sup>

Now the impossibility was there in the individual order: under the system the individual is helpless. But the individual is never helpless in the social order. He can, with the other employers, organize institutions which change that industry and which make a just wage possible.

So there you have the picture of social justice. There is a justice which deals with pay envelopes, with individual friends of individuals, with the props that are the individual possession of each one who is supported, who is propped up in his personal dignity. But there are other relationships which are specifically social, which cannot be done by a single individual.<sup>20</sup>

The single individual in both of those examples of Pius XI was helpless. He became unhelpless, he became able to work, only when he got other people in, when he organized institutions with others, when he changed the industry with others. Once he organizes with others, and once he starts working on the structure itself, then he can remove injustices which for the individual are completely impossible to remove. So you see there is the picture.

### **Social Justice and the Common Good**

Now this social justice is a much better, much more full conception than the legal justice of Aristotle. There's something to Aristotle's idea — that legal justice, general justice, is all the virtues insofar as they are referred to another.

Evidently the common good of our society is going to be made up of a certain number of things. There are the material resources of nature which are fixed — we can't do much about them. Then there is our ability to transform those resources, there we can do a great deal, technology we call it. Then we have all the acts of all the virtues — the way Aristotle saw very clearly — because every act of every virtue will make our society better, will make our society more livable, more human and therefore more perfective.

And then finally — what nobody saw up till Pius XI — there is the fact that all of those actions can be organized together into institutions, and can be reorganized into better institutions when the institutions suffer.

So those four things — the resources of nature, the ability to transform them, the acts of all the virtues, and then our power to turn these acts into structure, into institutions — these are the components, if you want, of the common good.<sup>21</sup> And when Aristotle said that general justice consisted of all the acts of all the virtues,<sup>22</sup>

you can see that he was saying in a certain way that it had to do with the common good.

But he didn't say that and it was not developed. St. Thomas was the one who pointed out that the general justice that Aristotle talked about was the virtue that had the common good as direct object, in other words, to improve, safeguard the common good itself as the mold of our perfection. And he didn't say how you could do it, except by repeating what Aristotle had said that every act of every virtue would help us along.<sup>23</sup>

It was only Pius XI in 1931 who completed the picture and showed that it was our ability to structure our actions into institutions, to make those institutions conform to human perfection. It was that which was the object of social justice, the act of social justice. Then the object, the necessity of that act would be to structure that society so that it conforms to human perfection so that it brings men along to become better images of God.

There you have a very brief résumé, a brief summary, as you can see, of well over 2,000 years of human thought. You can't insist too much on the fact that before 1931, you couldn't have talked about social justice in any way that made sense. You couldn't have known what the terms were, although the problem was open from Aristotle on down. Aristotle had opened the problem up in the fourth century before Christ. And here, only in 1931, we begin to get a complete picture of the answer.

I insist on that because it is important to know that you are dealing with something that was not only important — if it's common good it's important — but also extremely difficult. Two hundred years and more the best minds of the Western world had that problem open and it was one of their biggest problems. But only in our day are we coming to a coherent theory of how we can meet that problem and with what tools. So that is the doctrine of social justice.

### **Now Social Charity ...**

Now we don't want to talk about that except, as Aristotle did, to introduce our subject. Our subject is social charity. You have seen this, that society is important in the development of human perfection. Pius XI has a very good description of that importance. He said that the institutions of human life take so tight a grip on our development that they largely determine whether and to what extent individual perfection is even open to each one.<sup>24</sup> (It was actually his Secretary of State who wrote it, but we happen to know that Pius XI was instrumental even in the terminology.)

We can see how that would be true. What chance would a child have, for example, in an atheistic country, violent and totalitarian? In a total atheistic

country, what chance would a child have of coming to a knowledge of God, if society limited its perfection, limited to what extent it could attain perfection?

The subject therefore is important. It was difficult. It took all those centuries to get it worked out. And it's becoming more and more important with every passing year. We'll see in one of the subsequent talks how everything at the present time is becoming bigger and bigger, more complex, more integrated, how the process of socialization, as John XXIII called it, is increasing with every passing day.

With every increase of socialization you can see immediately you have a greater need for this virtue which controls socialization, which structures for human perfection. And if we can't structure it for human perfection, then the bigger it gets the more it oppresses us, the more it deprives us of the possibility of perfection.<sup>25</sup> So with every passing moment this doctrine of social justice is becoming more important. And by the same token, it becomes important that we should know what is the soul of this social justice and how we can handle it.

Now let's pay attention to the few details we have. It's very seldom that on an important subject you can have the complete literature available. But you have it in your hands. The complete literature on social charity is first in "On Restructuring Social Order." It is the statement that social charity is the soul of social justice and besides that it is ten mentions of the name itself, but always in combination with social justice, so that you don't have any more information.

Pius XI mentions social charity with social justice because social charity is the soul. The next encyclical which explained that one<sup>26</sup> because there had been a great deal of very futile discussion about this social justice and social charity. In that one Pius XI lifted the veil a little on what he was thinking, when he pointed out that society is the image of God in a way that exists nowhere else. Therefore society as such, as an image of God, has to be an object of love.

Now let's work with those two ideas. That's the literature; where do we go from there? Perhaps we can take something that will come later on, but perhaps we can take it here just as an introduction.

When Karl Marx began analyzing the society of his time, the society of the early Industrial Revolution, he found tremendous injustices. Among other things, as you know, the factory owners found that children five or six years old could reach into the threads and tie them when they broke much better than the older people with hair on their hands. So these factory owners went out to hire children five or six years old as well as a great many women in the weaving industry, *etc.*

The factory owners fully expected — they never saw any reason to expect anything different — that those people would work as long as they could keep the factory open, in other words, as long as it was light. And they didn't see any reason

for paying them anything more than was necessary to get them back to work the next day.<sup>27</sup>

You've all read about the Industrial Revolution, about the tremendous injustices that grew up before men had a chance really to think their due processes through, and Marx saw that. He saw that this new capitalism, as it was then called, this economics which dealt with impersonal relationships like the market, value, capital, labor, wage, *etc.*, that these impersonal relationships were killing not only men and women, but even innocent children, five or six years old. He had to try to correct that injustice.

We all know how he tried to correct it. He decided that the only thing you could do was to throw the whole thing out and start over, to destroy everything that was there by violent revolution and then to rebuild a society that would be just.<sup>28</sup>

Now let's just look at his reaction for a moment and see what it seems to imply. The first implication was that you couldn't do anything with what was there. If the only solution was by violence to destroy everything that was there and then to build something better, evidently what was there had no value whatsoever. It was something that could only be destroyed.

Now let's think of the common good in the sense that we mentioned before. Evidently Marx wasn't going to destroy the resources. What he would destroy would be man's relationships with one another — the way in which institutions were made, the way in which capital was exercised, the way in which factories were organized, *etc.*<sup>29</sup>

Let's look at the common good with its four elements. Recall that these consist of the wealth and resources of nature, our power to transform them, our relationships with one another in all ways, all the virtues, and above all our way to organize, our way to organizing our actions so as to accomplish tasks bigger than we are. Evidently what Marx wanted to destroy really was that last thing. He wanted to destroy the way capital was organized, the way in which it worked, the methods it used, *etc.*, because it was those things which determined the society, and determined the injustices he saw. Now, with that provision, Karl Marx saw a society which was evil. He wanted to destroy that evil completely, to get it out of the way and then to remake a new society with the wealth and resources of nature that would be left.

What are we to think of that approach? Was it a failure in justice? No, you can't say that it was. The organization that Marx saw and that Marx condemned and that Marx wanted to destroy, that organization was evil. It was bringing in very young children, as soon as they could be taught how to do something in sequence, because the smaller they were the easier they could get in among the threads. I used the age five or six there before as an extreme example. Evidently

most of them were not that; they were mostly children 8, 10 or 12 years old, who could be guided easier. But there was no age limit. If there were younger ones to tie the threads, the younger ones were taken.

So the thing was evil, tremendously evil, and we can sympathize with Marx that he wanted to destroy that evil and wanted to start the thing over. Where do we have to stop sympathizing with him? In the fact that he misunderstood his problem. If the common good is organized — he would have admitted that — then you can't destroy everything and start over. You have to start with what you've got.

We come here to something that sounds very much like charity. Remember, "Charity covers a multitude of sins." We love our friends, our relatives, with their faults. We don't love them because of the fact that they have no faults.

I have a friend who is very exigent about his friends. As soon as someone doesn't measure up he kicks him out and looks for someone else who is better. Of course, he is always changing. I tell him, "Well, look, my friends are integrated, both sinners and saints. And I have a lot less trouble. I can keep them all."

So that's what charity does. It's integrated; it takes things as they come. It tries to find what's good in people, and it loves what's good in them. It knows that people are not saints and that even the saints are hard to live with. It knows that and it accepts that anyhow.

So that just as we accept our friends with all their faults, so the first lesson of social charity is that we accept our society with all its faults. It's our society; it's the only common good we have. If we try to destroy that we have lost our common good and we can't be without that. So that we must — there's no way out of it — we must maintain our common good in order to perfect it.

You see then why social charity, which accepts the common good the way it is, is the soul of social justice. Because the moment you stay with your society, that moment social justice gets you and you have to try to perfect it, you have to try to make it better.

I have a very good friend in Colombia whom I happened to be with one time a number of years ago, although with the political disorganization that is there now, he'd probably do the same thing. I was there during a time when Colombia had an extremely important election. The Catholics felt that the outcome very much depended on Christians coming out ahead of what they call the liberals, the anti-clericals, the secularists.

This family, which is a very pious family and also very rich, has its own private chapel. They asked for special permission to have exposition of the Blessed Sacrament the whole election day. They made very sure that every hour of that

whole day some member of that family was there praying for good elections — and not one of them voted! There was not a vote that came from that house. They all were busy praying that the votes would be good.

You can see right away there's a misunderstanding there. They don't understand their common good. They have a completely false approach to it.

Now the same thing can be said of Karl Marx. I suppose he was as much interested in justice as they were. But his remedy was just as ineffective — less pious, but just as ineffective. He failed in not keeping his society, and therefore, in not getting into it.

I asked my friends in Columbia afterwards, I was curious, I said, "Well, now will you mind telling me why you don't vote, why you don't get into politics, if politics needs attention so much?" They said it was so dirty that they couldn't afford to be in it. Their conscience can't accept that sort of thing. Politics is unjust, it's dirty, it's venal, and we don't have anything to do with it.

Now, what about those people? They were not accepting the only common good that exists — the only one, there was no other one. And that one had to be accepted with all its faults, the same way we accept our friends. And once we have accepted it, then social justice demands that we change it so that we can get rid of its faults. There you have the picture how social charity is the soul of social justice.

### **Who Is Obligated?**

Anyone who says that politics is too dirty a business to be in, and I'm sure you've all heard that from someone or other, that person may be a very virtuous person, but only on one condition, that is, on Chesterton's conditions for ignorance. He, in one of his books, had occasion to use the word "our innocence," "until we have lost our innocence." Then he put a parenthesis "(that is, our invincible ignorance)," closed the parenthesis and went on.

So insofar as this person would be ignorant of what social charity was he might be virtuous, at least he wouldn't go to hell. But insofar as he would know what social justice would be, he could not say without sin, that politics is so dirty that he won't get in it. Just because it's dirty and because it's yours, because it's the common good that, yours, you must get into it, you must stay with it and then as soon as you stay with it you must change it because it's dirty.

There you have a complete machinery if you want, a complete instrumentality to get hold of society, to get hold of our social life and to make something out of it.

Now that machinery, that framework was not there before 1931. Everybody knew that you ought to try to make things better. Everybody knew that a bad society was a bad thing, but there was no clear scientific conception of how you'd have to go about it, how to make the society better and above all whether there was any obligation to do so.

In the past, we always thought of social action, social effort as a kind of option — you could take it or leave it alone. Some people like that sort of thing. It's very good for those who like it. But those who didn't like it could walk away. Not any more! In the measure in which we come to understand social justice and social charity, every one of us will have to be in one way or another involved in our society. First, in accepting them as they are, and then, once we have accepted them, we are obliged to get rid of their faults, to try to work to make them better, to make them more perfect instruments of human perfection. That's as far as we want to go now. I think we can have some questions.

But you see now what we are dealing with. It's something quite new. We are on the edge of thought here. People are beginning to think these things over for the first time in human history and, as I told you, the materials are very scarce. You have to work with your head. You can't work with books. There will be books, but they are not written yet.

Just as a little teaser if you want, I'll take back what I said. The books are being written, but in the most outlandish place you ever saw. You'd think that books about this would be written for seminaries and religious communities and things like that. You know what they are being written for? Business! For industry, by men who are making money, not by men who are trying to perfect and protect human nature — what you call human relations at the present time and it's a tremendous thing.

You go into any library and ask for their books on human relations in industry. You are going to find shelves and shelves of books because there are so many of them coming out. Men who are trying to think how you have to respect human nature as it is when you try to get human nature to work.

So the thing is being done. But it's not being done by people who are moralists, by people who have this preoccupation of human perfection. It's being done, strangely enough, by people who want to make money, and have discovered that in order to make money they are going to have to act human.

Now I think that's a very sad thing, that we whose business it is to safeguard human perfection have left these ideas fall almost without a flop and that other people who are making money have picked them up. Now what do we want to talk about?

## **Second Talk**

Let's see what we've done briefly before we start again. We saw something of the history of the development of social justice and social charity as clear and precise ideas, scientific ideas. The words "social justice" existed before, but not as a clear idea. Since Pius XI it is a very definite virtue, as clear and as precise and as scientific in its definition as any other virtue.

Social charity was not so developed. It was left to the theologians, and so far it has not been developed consistently in the same way that Pius XI himself developed social justice. But we can see the outlines. We can see at least the field that we should work in and what would have to be said about it.

Then we made some applications in order to explain that. It's a rather difficult concept. We had enough applications, I think, to give you the idea of what the significance of those virtues would be and their importance. Now this afternoon we wanted to develop the idea a little further.

### **Social Prudence**

We have two things here, the nature and significance of the social virtues in general, and finally social charity and the other social virtues in the practical order. Let's consider first of all society virtues in general. We can see in these two, social justice and social charity, certain common lines which would be true of any social virtue. And then history has a social virtue in it.

The moralists always recognized a social prudence and they divided that social prudence into three categories, so to say, three divisions, three classes of action. There was political prudence which was of two kinds, regnative and political, but the simple word political prudence is enough.

The older ideas that the king was somebody special hardly would hold water at the present time.<sup>1</sup> The king is a human being who happens to have a job and in those times, coming down from the earliest Western philosophies, there was a failure to see that human dignity belonged to the human person as such. They tried to put men's dignity in something else, in the fact that he was a citizen, that he was a king, or somebody special like that. Other people who didn't have that particular characteristic were simply excluded from the common good.

I imagine all of you who have read Aristotle, Plato, or Seneca know that very well. In pagan philosophy, in classical philosophy there were certain people who did not participate in the common good — women, children, foreigners, slaves and mechanics, in that order.

The worst of all were the mechanics, the people who worked by their hands but weren't slaves, who were, as we would say, free workers. Aristotle very clearly says what's wrong with them. He says at least the slave has a reflected glory from the citizen.<sup>2</sup> He belonged to somebody who's worthwhile. A mechanic has nobody, so the best thing you can do is become a slave.

So you get there a completely foreign frame of mind. We don't participate in that part of their philosophy at all. But you can see what it was. It was an attempt to build human worth on something that they understood, and something they understood was citizenship.

Because they were trying to do that, those who were not citizens were less than human, and we know the terrible definition of Aristotle, "A slave is useful for the wants of life."<sup>3</sup> In other words, a slave is a thing that you employ. It's not a human being. So there was a very limited conception of where man's dignity really lay in his value as the image of God, not in being a citizen or anything else.

So certain of their categories, very rigid categories, very well preserved, simply have no meaning. Aristotle and those other people after him went to great lengths to show how the king, because he exemplified citizenship in the fullest extent, was a perfect man, you know, better.

There's nothing quite so evident in history as the morals of kings and they are not good! But for that philosophy it was important that the king should be a perfect man because he best exemplified citizenship, and for them citizenship was the perfection of humanity. So sometimes we desert our philosophers and that's one of the places we desert them. So for us social prudence is just political prudence, we don't have to have regnative and political, just political.

Then there was economic prudence, and then there was a military prudence.

### **Social Prudence in Modern Management**

Now, strangely enough, we have rediscovered those three divisions in modern management. We can distinguish nowadays three different kinds of organizations. If welfare purposes, the perfections of the people inside the organization, is the primary purpose, then we call that an *organization of life* — the family, state, cities, neighborhood, tribes, Church.

All of those organizations have for their goal the perfection of the people inside them. That makes a particular kind of organization and it's guided in a certain way. Then you can also have, besides the perfection of people inside the organization, you can have the perfection of people outside the organization. Then you have an *organization of service*.

Any kind of business is an organization of service. The faculty of a university is an organization of service. Then you can have an organization which is concerned with the organization of the means for these two. See both of these, perfection of people inside and perfection of people outside the organization, would require means. And those means have to be adapted to those two purposes. But we have certain organizations where the means themselves become important.

You all know the definition of a successful army: It's the one that gets there first with the most. A military organization depends on the effectiveness of its means and its organization, because it is with its means and its organizations that victory is achieved.

So you have three kinds of organizations: 1) organizations of life, that's the political prudence of St. Thomas; 2) organizations of service, that's the economic prudence; and, 3) organizations of struggle, that's the military prudence. So that actually in this way we bridged a few centuries of human thought.

In social prudence we have some pre-thinking of some thinking that's being done now for the first time in the field of justice. There are different kinds of organizations that are fundamentally different in the kind of authority you have in them, in the kind of obedience you give in them, and in the way in which they are organized, *etc.* So there was a social prudence in history and you can read that in any moral book. But that's the only social virtue that was ever developed.

The legal justice — which is the same thing as social justice, only a primitive name — was never developed by St. Thomas as legal justice. It was simply named and, at the most, it was given by St. Thomas the goal, the purpose, of being at the direct service of the common good. But nobody ever developed the meaning of legal justice in the same sense that I just showed you.

That doctrine of social justice is now being developed. In fact, Pius XI simply gave up the old term. If you wanted to see how he did it, it's in an Encyclical called *Studiorem Ducem*.<sup>4</sup> He uses the word legal justice and social justice and he applies legal justice to the courtroom and social justice to the social order.<sup>5</sup> So he simply gave the term to the lawyers and never used it again. That's the only place Pius XI ever used the term legal justice and he handed it over to the lawyers. It's courtroom justice, legal justice, from now on. And the thing which was legal justice in history now is social justice, only with some body, with some meaning, with scientific definition.

## **Social Virtues in General**

Now we have three social virtues then, social prudence, social justice and social charity. Prudence was always there. Social justice or social charity were developed or named in the words of Pius XI and since the work of Pius XI we've begun asking some other questions. If three of the virtues have social twins, would it be possible that all virtues have one?

In other words, instead of having a morality which is largely individual but has a few social virtues in it, is there a whole social morality alongside the individual morality? That's a question which is becoming more and more clear as time goes on. In what way does it become clear?

From the structure itself of the social virtues that Pius XI pointed out and that we know from history and from prudence. In prudence there was — in that division I told you about which no longer exists and is valid — the regnative prudence which St. Thomas said was architectonic, structural. And the political prudence was executive. So that you can see that both deal with the structuring of action of society. And of course once you get into the social justice and social charity of Pius XI, the idea of structure is tremendously evident.

The direct matter of these virtues is change, structural change, and the title of the encyclical is "On Restructuring the Social Order." So once you see that point, these virtues have two things in common: some kind of a common goal — common activity in the pursuit of a common goal — and then they have some structure; they are bound together. One man can't do them; only people in society can do them.<sup>6</sup> Then you can see that evidently other virtues could have that characteristic besides justice and charity.

## **Social Fortitude**

Take courage, for example, fortitude. We all have heard of such a thing as organizational morale, which is a quite different thing from courage. It's easy to see that it's different. You can have some quite brave men, tremendous individual bravery and put them under ordinary leadership and they will go to pieces. You can take some very ordinary Joes, who are afraid of the dark, put them under good leadership and they'll tackle anything.

Social bravery and individual bravery are two different things, and you work at them in different ways. For bravery, individual bravery, you would give encouragement, you would try to give ideals and so forth. For morale, you might put on a good show — these are two different things — to get their sense of belonging, a sense of worthwhileness in the thing they are trying to do together.

So it's very probably that in this sense the concept of organizational morale, we're dealing with a social fortitude, which has the same relationship as social justice to individual justice or as social charity to individual charity. It's about structures; it's about things that are done in common.

### **Social Temperance**

In the same way it is quite possible that we can locate social temperance in any kind of organization. Well, let's take an example of what is obviously a certain lack of temperance.

Mike Quill,<sup>7</sup> before he died, when he was making his demands on the New York subways, his tactic was to be intemperate, to demand more than he expected to get and to keep insisting on that up to the last minute. The tactic was, if you want, intemperance.

Now there is a real effort on the part of any organization not to have those exorbitant demands on all sides, but to try to ask for things that people know that they can get. So in any business, in any group action, there is an attempt on the part of everybody, if they are interested in the organization, to play the game by the rules, so to say, to expect no more than they are likely to get for the common good.

Anytime all the people in the organization start asking for everything they can get, that organization goes to pieces. I imagine a good example would be the Common Market<sup>8</sup> in Europe and De Gaulle's idea of French grandeur. The two don't go together. You can have a Common Market, you can have a united Europe, but in getting that you have to limit your ideas of grandeur. And it's because he's trying to get both of them together that we have a lot of tension in Europe and we won't arrive at a united Europe.

That would be a certain example of a lack of social temperance, how much you want to ask of the group. Anytime a group of people are working together, they will ordinarily try to limit their demands to what all can get. And that desire to limit demands to what all can get is a kind of temperance. All you have to do is to ask for everything you can get, and nobody gets anything. Like a theater, for example, when somebody shouts "fire." If they all want to get out at the same time, nobody gets out. It's only insofar as they are willing to wait their turn that anybody can get out.

So there is a social temperance and what we wind up with is a kind of social virtue different from the individual virtue in every virtue we have named. Social justice has nothing in common for matter, for the way you do it, or for the time limit, with individual justice. If you owe a man 10¢ at 10:00 on Tuesday, then if you haven't paid him 10¢ at 10:00 on Tuesday, then you are unjust.

But you could never do social justice that way. Take the example that Pope Pius XI gave of changing an entire salary system to make a just wage possible. That evidently couldn't be done overnight because you must organize, promote and support such organizations with the other employers as a normal means. It may take years to just organize and promote those organizations before they get anything done.

So you see it is not something that can be done at 10:00 on any day. But individual justice is defined that way — you owe somebody something at 10:00, at 10:01 you're unjust if you haven't done it. So the things don't look the same, they don't act the same, they don't act with the same things. Individual justice deals with a wage or a piece of property; social justice deals with social structure, with society itself.<sup>9</sup> So the probability is that what Pope Pius XI pointed out to us is really a whole new morality which has to be written for the first time alongside the traditional morality.

In another context Pope Pius XI used the expression: "The pastoral theology of another day is now no longer enough."<sup>10</sup> It was in connection with what he then called Catholic Action. But it can apply to this. Pastoral theology, the moral theology of another date, is no longer enough. We have to move on. We have to see aspects of the truth that we never saw before.

But, as I mentioned in the first talk, it's unfortunate that our moral books, the books of the seminary and study, don't reflect any of this. The books that you want that will reflect this are in a different field entirely, they are in the field you call management, the theory of administration and of management — a purely secular enterprise which has no Christian influence at all except by accident.

That is unfortunate, and sooner or later we hope that the moralists will take over and will try to direct these people who are trying to think through the problem of management, in other words, the problem of trying to direct human effort towards the attainment of common goals. You can see in that very statement, "to direct human effort towards the attainment of common goals," that it is a moral problem. And the people who are thinking about it now are not moralists. The moralists are thinking about something else. I don't know what it is.

So when you come then to the nature and significance of social virtues, which is the second topic on our list for today, I think we've answered that to a certain extent. The nature of social virtues is that they always deal with organized activity, with human pursuit of common goals, of common perfection and the thing that sets them off is that structuring of activities.

### **Structure and Habit**

Now we might spend a few moments on that idea of structure, so that it becomes a little clearer to us. In the individual order, we have a thing called habit. For instance, when we are very small our mother teaches us to tie our shoes and it's a job, it takes quite a while!

Suppose that that first experience that we had of tying our shoes — which may take weeks before she gets around and gets it so that we can do it — suppose that had to be gone through every time we wanted our shoes tied. You can see there'd be no room in life for anything else.

We have time in our life for other things because tying our shoes becomes a habit and more than likely none of us ever thinks of tying our shoes every time. We do them, while we're thinking of something else.

That's only one example, a very ridiculously simple example, but our whole life is like that. If we didn't have habits, we would be absolutely stymied. We'd be paralyzed from one end of the day to the other just tying our shoes, or just getting in shape to perform an action. It's because we are, so to say, trained — because we have stored up in our own nerve complexes all of these habits — that we can live all during the day thinking about the goals that we have. But if we once had to think through every step, if we had to perform every step consciously, we would be completely paralyzed. Without habits we are hopeless.

Now what are those habits? They are structures, structures of individual actions. A good example is a man who would learn to play the piano, a great artist who has become great by practice. What does his practice consist in? It consists in organizing his nerve impulses. He may practice scales one day. He may practice rhythm one day. He may practice finger movements, accent, all kinds of things that he practices one after another.

As he practices them he stores the nerve impulses up in his memory bank, whatever that is, and they are there for him to use. When he comes to play he just reads the music and all of these habits are in action because he stored them up. If you haven't gone through that work, if you haven't done all of that practicing to store up habits, there's no use trying to play.

You've all heard the joke, I imagine, where someone asks a man whether he can play the violin, and he says, "Why I don't know, I've never tried." The answer always is, if you haven't tried, you don't know, because it is a question of building up habits, and until you've built up those habits, you can't play.

Now our whole life is like that. Until we build up the habits which we use every minute of the day, we can't live. We can transfer that same thing now to the social order. In the social order also there are habits and we call those habits "institutions."

Just try to think for a moment of the tremendous amount of confidence in the predictable actions of men that would be represented, for example, by a prisoner of war in Japan who would get extra rations for his companions in that war camp by

writing a check for the keeper. He wanted to buy some more food and he didn't have any money, so he wrote a check. This is a real case! The prison guard accepted the check, brought him the food and cashed the check in New York. He sent it in the mail and got the money.

Imagine that, a piece of paper which would just have a signature on it and which could be counted on by all the people concerned in that operation to make food available to those people who needed it. Evidently there's something in there besides paper and ink. There is a whole organization of life. A check means something, a signature on a check means something, something which would have a predictable response.

Now that check was a very simple example, in one way, of an institution. In another way it was very complicated. For example, in the example the check was signed with a pen; but if it was a Chinaman who was doing it, he'd sign it with a brush. Now the fact that you use a pen or a brush, that's an institution. It's a thing which has been built up over the centuries.

When you go into a store here in this country you ask what the price is of something and then somebody behind the counter will tell you what the price is, and then you either buy the thing or you walk out. That's incredible!

There are some places in the world where if you did that, you'd be locked up, you'd be crazy. What you do is you walk in and say, "I'd take it but it's spoiled, it's not good." Then the other person says, "Well, of course I could give you a little reduction on it." Then you say, "Oh, no, nothing you could do would make me interested in it now because it's not worth it." You start walking out, "No, come, come back ..." — what you call bargaining. That's the way you do it.

You'd never go in and ask what the price is. If you ask what the price is they'd tell you something twenty times what it should be and if you paid it you'd be stupid and they would be the first ones to despise you because you don't know how to live. Whereas in a fixed price tradition you go ahead and ask what the price is and then you expect them to tell you what the price is and then when they tell you, you either accept it or you don't. But if you may ask which one is the simpler of the two?

We had a man in China before the Communists. He wrote a story back on how you do business in China. He said when a missionary comes, it's the same as when a chicken fancier here has walked in among a group of foxes. He's a source of income for the community!

So when he wanted a piece of land to build his church on, his missionary compound on, he said, "I don't know how you'd do it in the West. Maybe you'd go and ask somebody what they'd want for their land; but over here that would be

suicide. What you do over here, is you let your number one boy know that this barren swamp back of the woods wouldn't suit your purposes if it were given to you with money to build on. And then as that word gets around, he [the owner] lets it be known to all his friends that if you had offered \$10,000 a square foot he still wouldn't consider it because that land is too valuable to alienate."

"This goes on for maybe five or six months. Nobody knows about it except the 10,000 people in the surrounding villages. And after everybody is quite clearly convinced that the missionary won't take the land at any price and that the man who owns it won't let it go under any consideration, the deal can be carried through with remarkable simplicity."

Now you'd ask which is the more complicated, this bargaining or the fact that you can walk into a store, ask what the price is, be told, and either buy it or walk out. Which is the more complicated? Fixed price! The other one is simple because you build it as you go. Nothing is understood, nothing is structured. You go in and you try to get the best deal under whatever circumstances there are.

Whereas when you go into the store and ask what the price is, that's an indication of what the real value of that thing is. You're taking that all for granted. But look what organization is behind that. And you simply say, if you find it too expensive, "No, I can't afford that. I'll have to get something cheaper."

They don't run out after you, they don't grab your coattails because they know that you can't afford this thing and that that's the price of it. That's a tremendously complex social structure, yet it looks simple. The reason is that it is such complexity, such structure, which makes our life simple, which makes it possible to live.

An activity which is the case of that missionary might require three or four years of delicate negotiations with us might be done in 15 minutes. That seems that all the rest of those three or four years is available for something else. We have structured life therefore, it has become simple in the same way that tying our shoes becomes simple, we have set up social habits.

This relationship between the man who writes the check, and the bank which is willing to cash it and the one who expects to be paid, that relationship has been structured and it has taken centuries of hard work on all sides to get that structure solid. Everybody knows exactly what the rules are, exactly what everything means. It is on the basis then, that all of that work has been done, that we can now write a check and hand it to a stranger and expect that another group of strangers in some bank are going to honor that check and do what is expected.

So you see what society means. Society is a complex of habitual acts, of expectations that are assured, so to say — when you do this you get this result.

Therefore, when you want this result all you have to do is to do this. Whereas if you didn't have that structure, it might take you two months, or two years or ten years to get to that result because you'd have to do everything yourself. In the same way you'd be paralyzed if you had to learn to tie your shoes every morning, so you'd be paralyzed if you had to explain what it meant whenever you wrote a check.

So there's the vision of society — that we can live together because we have built up common expectations of habitual actions, of actions that are always the same. They always have the same significance and people count on that like we count on it. Because we can count on these common expectations we can live. You can see then why society becomes important for human perfection.

If it weren't for those structures all of us would be exactly like those rare individuals who are somehow lost in their earliest infancy and were taken care of by animals. That exists. There have been cases where children abandoned or somehow lost have been taken care of by wild animals. They grew up and were discovered later on.

They had the form of a human being, but they had none of the capacities. They couldn't even learn, even though they were eight or nine years old. By the time they were found they could never learn a language. The connections are missing; the possibility of learning is missing.

There have been one or two examples of that in history. They have been great scientific discoveries and curiosities. But there's no chance for a fully human life with other people. They didn't have a society around them. They are not able to perfect themselves. They are like people who die in infancy — they never develop.

So a society is, for that reason, our greatest single resource in coming to perfection. It makes things possible that would not be possible otherwise. It makes it possible to do things within reasonable time limits so that we can carry out goals with them. If it weren't for that we would be entirely preoccupied our whole life long with the details. We would never get to goals, and it's only insofar as we arrive at our goals that we respect ourselves.

So there's the nature and significance of social virtues. And they become very important. We're going to see that tomorrow — the special significance of social charity in our times. We're living in a time when organizations are becoming more and more important, bigger and bigger and always our goals are becoming greater. That means our need for these organizations, for control of organizations is becoming bigger also.

## **Social Charity and the Other Social Virtues in the Practical Order**

Now, finally, social charity and the other social virtues in the practical order. We're going to have to do some tremendous re-learning when we get these social virtues clear in our own minds. Luckily until we do that we are in Chesterton's definition of innocence. We don't know. But I'll give you some examples.

I know people, and you do too, who would never think of being jealous in their personal life, who if they meet someone who does something better than they do, they are happy that someone else has qualities that they don't have. They are willing to accept themselves the way they are and they are happy that other people can do things better. They are quite happy and jealousy is foreign to their nature.

If you want to see a wonderful example of human mutation, make that person president of some Catholic society. Then let some other society in the same field do something better. You are going to see immediately a reaction of jealousy. Immediately! The things that we would never think of doing in our own private lives because we have private rules of virtue which take care of them, are completely overturned when we get into social obligations.

Then you'll find people with what we call organizational patriotism. It is ordinarily, and I mean ordinarily, exercised by trying to repress other organizations whereas your individual perfection is never done in that way unless you are psychologically in trouble. There are some people who can't feel any worth themselves unless they have got their foot on somebody else's neck.

Some of those really confirmed racists are like that. It's not a problem of social order; it's a problem of psychology. The real racist is one who has made his personal worth depend entirely on the fact that he is not a Negro — that's something that he can handle. And of course if you try to tell him a Negro is equal to him you give him a psychological crisis which is tremendous and he won't go along. To admit that is to admit that he has no worth himself. Some people work that way.

Now that's the normal way in organization. We haven't any rules, so to say, to guide our conduct and we have allowed our organizational loyalties, our organizational responsibilities, organization rivalries, organizational jealousies, our jurisdictional rights, we have allowed them to get away from us because we had no rules for them — we didn't know what social virtues were.

Certain movements at the present time, like the Better World Movement<sup>11</sup> which we will talk about later on, have taken as a kind of mission to try to get Catholic organizations to be Christian. That's really what they are trying to do. They are trying to make Catholic organizations Christian.

One of the greatest difficulties these movements find in the way of Christianization of the world is that organizations as such are not Christian. They are jealous. They are competitive in the wrong sense. They are suspicious of one another and you have there a whole field of life where we don't worry about our virtues, or where we call them by other names.

If you ask someone, for instance, why he is trying to run down another organization, or why he is trying to drive it out of existence, or why he is trying to do this or that he would always tell you that it is loyalty to his own organization. That he has to or it's his obligation as President, or he must defend the rights, or he must safeguard the jurisdiction, and so on.

They'll have words like that which explain their actions, but not which explain their results. The results show quite simply that we don't have in our intellectual baggage when we deal with social conduct the kind of rules we have for individual conduct. And when we come to know these social virtues, come to apply them, we are going to find that we have an increased control over these organizational tasks just as we have a better control over our personal activities when we know the individual virtues.

I'll give you an example of that better control. I've had occasion on numerous occasions, in fact, to raise funds in a town where I wasn't quite at home, in a town where I didn't know all the rules.

My first preoccupation always is to get the right organization to start. You get the wrong organization to start and your name is mud. They'll be a certain pecking order in the organizations; you get the right one and you can get the collaboration of the others. You get the wrong one, and nobody else will look at you. You have to learn where the rivalries and the jealousies and the jurisdictional disputes are under possible control — if you miss that key you are lost.

You can see right away there are a great many very good goals that we never arrive at because we run into these jurisdictional disputes, these organizational rivalries. One famous historical example was the rivalry — always for the glory of God, of course — between the Jesuits and the Franciscans in the Far East.

There was a time when the Far East looked as if it could be converted to Christianity. And the reason it was not was that the Franciscans didn't like what the Jesuits were doing. You all know the story, I imagine, it's nothing new to you. But there is a good example. And I assure you it was all for the glory of God at all times.

None of them had the suspicion that they were doing that for unworthy motives, in other words, for organizational motives. Yet there you have a wonderful historical example and that's not an isolated example. You always can give

examples about Jesuits because they are used to it. But you can do the same thing about most other religious societies.

If you get down on a low enough level where you'd be dealing with local needs or diocesan needs you could always find it for every society, where organizational jurisdictional disputes, jealousies, rivalries or whatever you want, have been used for the glory of God.

Of course, you can see right away much of the work of the Council on the coordination of the pastoral task under the Bishop, the coordination of the religious and the diocesan work, is simply a confession that that was not done in the past. There was something that was lacking in the past and ordinarily the reason it was lacking is what we are talking about here — jurisdictional, organizational considerations which we didn't know how to handle.

We looked upon them as virtue — patriotism to our own organization, loyalty to our own organization — and not knowing how to handle it, that got interpreted as rivalry, envy, sometimes open opposition, attempts to destroy. So it has a very great meaning in the practical order, for ourselves, that we can be more integral Christians.

Not too long ago I was talking to someone about a person who was rather well known in these corporate aggressions, you know, the social attitudes towards other organizations. I don't know how it came up, but the person I was talking to, he was talking French, said, "Il est Catholique, il n'est pas chretien." "He's a Catholic, but not a Christian!" He meant on that conduct, the social conduct.

Oftentimes, I think, now knowing these social virtues, we fit in that category — we are Catholics but not Christians. Oftentimes the question that was asked this morning about the ghetto organization is an expression of that. We are by ourselves not because we are trying to learn, as I said this morning, but because we depreciate the other organizations around us and they are possibilities to do good.

So there, those are the main lines that are on the paper for development this afternoon. I don't want to talk too long because I think you get it clearer if you can ask questions about it. You have now the main lines that we are talking about and if we will just get some questions to develop it better, good. If not I may talk some more.

## **Third Talk**

These talks are supposed to get more practical as we go on now. We had some idea of the theoretical aspect and there is probably one other theoretical consideration we ought to go into before we go ahead. I can do it as a kind of review. As we saw yesterday the particular business of social charity is to respect, accept, and to love our common good, the community of life in which we live. Then when that community is thus respected and accepted, in our allegiance we have to stay with it even though it has certain deficiencies.

We love it as we love our friends — with their faults. And then once we stay with our organization, our community, our common good in that way because of our acceptance of it, because of our attachment to it, our love for it, then social justice takes over, of which social charity is the soul. Social justice requires that we adapt that community, that organization, that common good, as much as possible to the necessities of human perfection, of human development so that we can arrive in our societies at a real human development, a real human perfection.

### **Social Charity**

Now, as I told you yesterday, the literature on social charity is rather restrictive. The formal material which has value is pretty much in the Papal encyclicals. The word occurs and the idea also without the word in the encyclicals of Pope John XXIII. The ideas occur in the Council. But the technical development and scientific analysis and elaboration of the concept has not caught on the way we would have expected it.

I told you yesterday two of the reasons why it had not caught on. The theologians, the moralists are a little worried about the concept of social charity and social justice. First of all because they don't see how society as such has personal characteristics, can be an object of love, and they don't see how the word charity can be applied to something which evidently is going to be human, not divine.

Man's organizations, his institutions, go far beyond the Christian civilization. When you apply social charity as a technical term to all organizations of human perfection you step on the theologians' toes. They wanted to reserve that word for only the supernatural. Those are two of the prejudices which have made them very hesitant about taking up these new ideas, and developing them.

### **Where Two or Three Are Gathered Together ...**

Now we can go a little further with the theoretical development. Father Lombardi in the Better World Movement likes to do this. He says that when we interpret the scripture text, “Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them,”<sup>1</sup> we usually interpret it wrong. We think that once we have established our unity, then Christ comes into that, whereas the much more fundamental truth is that once you have seen the doctrine of social charity, in forming that unity we have placed Christ there.

It is the unity itself, the community of life itself which is Christ. Where charity and love are, there is God. Not that He comes in, but He is there. And in that sense, you see, that expression, “Where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them,” would be the group itself, not that Christ comes into the group, but the group itself is an image of Christ.

Pope Pius XI said of all society that in society man imitates the divine perfections in ways that would not be possible to him were he to be alone. So that as soon as we are together, as soon as we have a community of life, as soon as we penetrate one another’s actions and goals and ideals, we are already closer to God. Not that He has to come into it. But that union, the unity, that community of life is an image of God and for that reason it is worthy of love as we saw.

### **Special Significance of Social Charity in Our Times<sup>2</sup>**

For today’s work we have the special significance of social charity in our times — Conciliar times which we will talk about tomorrow and then the regular life of the world whether inside the Church or out in this 20<sup>th</sup> century. Is it true that we have a very special need of social charity and social justice in our times? Yes, very much true.

Probably the best way to see it — since most of us are educators — is in the general disorientation of the young which we notice all around us. The world has become simply too big for them to feel that they can handle it. They feel left out, they feel alienated as some of us said yesterday, the organizations seem too big and too impersonal, too unmanageable and they revolt. They feel that too much is being asked of them. That fact that the organizations are becoming bigger, that the control of human life is becoming more complex, more technical, more difficult to acquire, that certainly is true.

The modern world has been made by a series of very great changes in the way people live, the way that they conduct their affairs, changes so great that we can call them Revolutions. You’ve all had occasion to go through these with your students — in your teaching of history, if you are teaching history — or which you

certainly have seen in your own studies. The modern world is often thought to begin with the discovery of the Western hemisphere, the new world by Columbus; that's at the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, 1492, 1500, so it just gets over into the 16<sup>th</sup> century.

That discovery of a New World opened up horizons, opened up possibilities to the old countries of Europe and we know that they went out and colonized this new world and set up trade with the rest of the world, with the Old World. That's the reason that they found the New World; they were looking for the old one. Europe wasn't very rich or very powerful in those days. The great civilizations were in the Far East so that it was very important for merchants to be able to get over to the Far East and get the silks, gold, spices and things like that with which they could do business.

It was in order to open up those riches of the East that the era of navigation began which opened up the New World. We call that the Geographical Revolution. The discovery of a whole new world, of a new place, farms to multiply, to settle, and with that already the population of the world began growing. There was more room, more possibility and, shortly after that, we have a number of Technical Revolutions, the Agricultural and the Genetic Revolutions, when we discovered that we could control the growth of crops, the rotation of crops, the use of hybrid strains, the use of insecticide, fertilization — all of those things changed age-old patterns and made it possible to grow much more food than ever before.

Immediately after that came the Industrial Revolution which we all know about — the use of machinery, the use of power (originally water and then steam power) to drive those machines. This emancipated man from hand tools and hand labor and which made it possible for him to increase production enormously and for that reason to feed a much bigger population.

The population was growing as a result of the Medical and Sanitation Revolutions which came about the same time. The Revolution of Medicine — the discovery of the cause of ailments, the disease in germs, viruses, the ability to control them, the discovery of sterilization, of vaccination, of immunization, all kinds of discoveries so that men lived longer — all of these different revolutions were preparing the modern era. It hadn't come yet.

Only in this present century we began to really develop the powers that we have been getting over the centuries with these new revolutions. We have the Second Industrial Revolution, that changed into electric power instead of steam, the building up of a whole new industries that weren't known before like the petrochemicals and the mechanization of almost all production. Then we have our present Technological Revolution which all of us know very well — space exploration, atomic energy, antibiotics, automation — things which were not thought of before and which are now changing the whole way of life.

## **The Management Revolution**

With every one of these revolutions (and now there's another one, a very important one, at the beginning of the century), as these techniques became more complicated, as the production became more expanded, multiplied, the necessity of management became more exigent. Men sat down and thought out how they could run their affairs, how they could run an industry, how they could manage a state, how they could manage an organization of any kind. So that with the beginning of the century you have for the first time concentrated attention on how to get people to work together.

Of course, that was always a preoccupation but it was never a scientific thing; it was always a personal thing. And some men like Caesar and Napoleon could do it and other men couldn't do it. But there was no way of knowing how they did it, nor was there any way for them to pass on their knowledge to others. The vocabulary wasn't there; the concepts weren't there.

At the present time, though, in order to meet this bigger and bigger world which is growing up around us, the more and more complicated world, more and more specialized, a world that presents us with bigger and bigger tasks, we've been learning more and more how to get men to engage men in common tasks, how to get them to work together, and to get them to work together at tasks that are bigger than they can handle alone. So there's no question. This world in which we are living is becoming in a remarkable way more complicated, more difficult to manage, and along with that, we have been becoming more clever.

We've been getting the material necessary to manage it. It is this fact — that the world has been changing so rapidly into a different scale of magnitude and that our methods are following, that — we're learning how to handle it — it is largely this fact that has alienated the younger people from their civilization. It makes them feel they are left out, they haven't got anything to say and that no matter what they do they can't influence anything because it's all bigger than they are. So that's the first thing. The social charity and social justice about which we have been speaking are tremendously important for us because of the fact that we live in this new world which is expanding at such a rapid pace, which is growing so rapidly.

Perhaps, if we want to later, if we have the time, I could take us through a few more details, indications how this growth is occurring. It is so big that oftentimes we don't even realize it. All of us know that the principal means of transportation in the world didn't even exist when we were younger. The airplane is something which was invented and developed, and it took over the whole of passenger transportation — within our own lifetime, within one lifetime.

Other whole aspects of life, like television would certainly have a shorter history; the new ones, space exploration, and atomic energy even shorter. So you can see that we have a more and more complicated world, one that is reaching out for bigger and bigger tasks, which has more and more people in it — that's one of the easiest ways of understanding what's been happening.

We try to trace the growth of population, and in no other way can you understand so quickly and so clearly what has been happening to the world. The population has been growing, and it grows in direct relation, absolutely direct relation, to the possibility. In the whole history before the time of Columbus, before the beginning of this modern world, population remained pretty much the same. There were fluctuations, but production was limited, definitely limited.

As soon as a group of people went beyond the power of their production, either a famine came or they found it necessary to look for new land to grow things on, or somebody next door came over and tried to take their land. The result was they were pushed back down and most of them killed off and then they were able once more to start growing.


The whole history is a period of cycles like that. There was a period of prosperity when the people are below the productivity of the land. As they get prosperous, as they grow up past the productivity of the land, then comes a famine, a war, or something else to put them down again. Then they start another period of prosperity.

That happened whether you talk about tribal peoples or whether you talk about great empires. The time of the cycle was more or less, but it was always a cycle. The world's population didn't increase much before the modern world. It stayed just about the same with periodic catastrophes which reduced the population to a point where it could once more grow within the limited means as they existed.

Such a thing as the great famine in Asia, in India at the present time, that's completely and absolutely normal! That's the way history was all the time. The unusual thing is that it should be possible to do something about it.

The fact that President Johnson could promise 3 million extra bushels of grain and fund them \$300 million for developing the human potential, and that over the course of the year we will sell some eight or ten million bushels of grain to the Indians to make up for the deficit, that's possible for the first time in our time. Before that the same thing happened, the same kind of famine, on the same scale relatively, but nobody could do anything about it. There were no means there and they were needing help all over the world so that population was a stable characteristic of the earth. It's only in our time that it is not.

Now we have some chalk, I'll show you what that means.



If you ‘d take this blackboard and try to get a square here. Draw a line there at the edge of the graph we want to make, and divide this thing into three parts.

Why divide it into three parts? Well, at the year 1963 there were 3 billion people in the world. We want to represent those 3 billion people so we divide it into three parts and each part into tens like that so that each one of those marks from top to bottom is 100 million people. With the 30 of them you would have 3 billion people in the year 1963 about here.

We'll put along the bottom the same size of marks and also three just for fun, to have a reference, and here that mark will be a hundred years. We're trying to see how things have changed, how the world has changed, how things are bigger and more complicated, how they are handled at the present time.

Now on that scale where you have here 30 marks or a hundred years each and here 30 marks of a hundred million people each, you could draw a curve of population for the top corner down to here that goes to a 1,000 years before Christ, the time when Solomon's Temple was begun. Solomon's Temple was begun about 1,000 years BC, and so that at that time, 1,000 years before Christ, and we can see population growing up to 1963 when it went off the scale. The line over there would be the year 2000, 34 years from now will be that line, and we are then 34 years out.

Now the thing about that line is that it stays in the margin, it stays along the edge, it doesn't go vertically, it goes horizontally! Considering that in the time when Solomon built his temple there may have been 75 to 100 million people in the world. And there were not many more at the time of Christ at the year 1.

Then you can keep on going through the early Middle Ages, the Dark Ages, the late Middle Ages, the time of the Protestant Reformation, *etc.*, and you'd come to the time we spoke of as the beginning of the modern world, the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, about 1500. About 1500 you would have this situation: about 400 million people in the world, an educated guess, and 1500 would be five of these marks out.

At this point 4 up and 5 out we could indicate the population at the time of Columbus, and at that point then you go back in history as we saw to the time of Solomon's temple. You can keep on going back as long as you want, because no matter what your theory, whether you have billions and billions of years behind that, you keep on going and you never get above that line. It always stays about the same. Population remains pretty much equalized because, as I said, as soon as it grew a little bit, it got beyond the means of production. Then there came a famine which put it down, or there came an invasion — some one who was looking for land that they wouldn't have a famine.

That was the picture then of human society in its growth during all the ages from the time of Columbus on back to creation — never, never any change. A big empire like Rome or Persia — it made no difference. They simply reached out and pulled in those people who were starving anyhow and were able to pitch a little bit

of what they didn't eat and bring it into the central place and live much better, but they didn't increase the production.

Now after this point, at the time of Columbus, we begin stepping into the modern world, but it takes about 3 centuries before the modern world really hits us, before we reach the big change which has come in the present century, in the 1900s. We are here in the 1500s and we saw certain revolutions. There was the Geographical Revolution that sent population up, more places to go. The Agricultural Revolution grew more food, and as more food was available people didn't die so soon.

At this point in history, by the way, the average length of life was 27 years. The average life span was 27 years for the most advanced peoples, for others it was lower. Then as this line goes up, the life span goes up, then you have then the Industrial Revolution, you have the Medical and Sanitation Revolution, that goes up through, we said, 1963 when it goes off the line. We have 34 years left to the end of the century, till 2000, and when that 34 years is represented, you have to have as much extra space, in other words, about three feet up on the next floor, for 34 years, so you see what's happened.

One whole kind of history exists for the beginning of the modern world. Below that you have a subsistence history — small institutions, small groups of people, small production, very limited possibilities of organization and work. Past that line you have a completely different kind of history. You can see it is growing not only rapidly, but increasingly, so that at the present time every single year will add as much to the population as there were in the whole world at the time of Christ.

When Christ said "Go and teach ye all nations, baptizing them ..." <sup>3</sup> He was talking about a historical task; you'd have from that time on to the end to do it. He was talking about a task the same size as we get now with each passing year. That task is added to our task each passing year because at the present time, the population of the world increases from 75 to 80 million people a year, as many as there were in the whole world at the time of Christ.

When you get to that next stage, you remember, three or four feet up on the next floor, that population will be increasing over 100 million people a year, because with each year it increases more since it's a percentage of a bigger group. Now that's a fact, that the population can increase like that, that it is a different world than that one. That reflects in a kind of summary way, the kind of result of all the things that we were talking about here, the different technical revolutions, the different abilities that we discover to govern bigger and bigger groups of men, to tackle bigger and bigger tasks, and you can see it's all part of history. That's the way history is.

If we don't learn to do bigger and bigger tasks, we're lost because the tasks are bigger and bigger. I like to explain the dynamics for that by saying that on the subsistence part, the horizontal part, the human race had more and more time to do less and less, because as you got something that was done you had less still to do. The other part, what we call the Age of Development, the vertical part we have always less and less time to do more and more.

If you want to see a very, very literal application of that, that line that reaches the top of that blackboard after how many centuries there were from creation, we don't know how many there were. It may be ten thousand years, maybe a hundred thousand years, we don't know. The Bible is not a chronology in that sense. We don't have any idea at the moment, there's a good deal of controversy about how old the human race really is. But whatever age it has, it took that long for the line to reach the top of the board.

It's going to cover the same distance, exactly the same distance, in 34 years. That's what you mean by saying less and less time to do more and more, because the need to organize that extra population is going to be equal to the need to organize the one that's there. You had maybe ten, twenty, thirty, forty, thousand years to do the first one; you have 34 for the next! So you see what we are talking about.

The world is becoming more and more complicated, more and more extended, the tasks are becoming greater. For that reason our ability to handle them, our ability to organize, must become greater, because organization is simply our way of increasing our grasp to keep up with the thing we have to do. How did we say for Browning, "Man's reach must exceed his grasp"?

So there's the background. There's a very special need, a very special significance of social justice and social charity for our times.

Now let's look at some of the specific things. What I gave you there is background, the general background of history which shows you that with yesterday's methods you are helpless today.

I think for educators that's very interesting. If you hand on to the students, to the children in the school, yesterday's methods, the ones you grew up with, then you must expect the alienated people — the beatniks, the teenage manifestations, the ones who don't know what to do with the world — they feel crushed, they feel lost, they feel left out. This world is moving too fast.

You had a chance to feel at least some of the necessities for increasing your vision. They are thrown against it without any preparation whatever except what preparation you give them. That's the real problem of the teenagers at the present time. They are coming into this growing world without any kind of preparation

except what we give them and maybe we haven't been thinking enough about that. We've been so busy trying to get our own reach extended, that we haven't thought about them.

There's a real problem about educating young people at the present time. And this question of social justice and social charity is going to be a very great part of the solution. If we can give them a vision of the society which enables them to feel somehow in charge of it, they are going to be somehow a lot more balanced. If we let them find out, if they do find out, that society has become so big, so complicated, so impersonal, so immovable, that they just don't count, so to say, then they will have to seek some sort of fulfillment, as they call it, in other manifestations than regular duties of life.

### **Socialization**

Some of the examples of this increase in bigness. Pope John XXIII called it "socialization." He scandalized a lot of people with that word, but it's a word that's necessary. It doesn't mean socialism. Socialism is a doctrinaire position; socialization is this fact that the world keeps getting bigger by the minute and that the organizations that govern it must be getting more complicated by the minute.

Now what are some of the things that have grown outside? One of the most obvious is business, the giant corporations. A thing like General Motors, it's rather interesting to note, is a private corporation which has a bigger annual budget than all the governments of the world except four. There are only four governments in the world that have a bigger budget than General Motors and General Motors is a private organization.

Now just imagine an organization in private life which could become that big. It was in fact the one that began the Management Revolution. The methods that are used universally now in business were invented by Sloan, the president of General Motors, in order to govern this octopus, to try to keep it together, and he did keep it together. It's one of the most successful of human undertakings. But it means socialization on a scale never before attempted.

The space and atomic programs which we watch on the television are bigger than anything undertaken including General Motors. The problem of development, the necessity of bringing two-thirds of the population of this world to this new world where people can eat as much as they need.

I think I mentioned yesterday, and can't insist too much, that the great surprise about India at the present time, that its famine may involve 20 or 30 million deaths if we don't do something, that great famine is not at all surprising, that's the way people always live.

The surprising thing is that we are not that way, that a part of the world, a third of the world, has got to a place where it does not have famine. Because up until the beginning of this century such famines were ordinary. They were commonplace. They were the machinery of nature, so to say, keeping that line horizontal.

At the present time we don't keep the line horizontal. It's going up and these famines when they occur now are tremendously striking to us. The idea that a nation of some 400 million people wouldn't have enough to eat strikes us as extraordinary because the world today is not like that of the past. This world of ours, a complicated vast world with its unlimited resources, is something absolutely new in history.

Now we have a problem, and just imagine how big this problem is. We have the problem now of trying to extend our world out to the other two-thirds, to give these techniques of running General Motors to people who ten years ago didn't wear clothes, in Africa, for example. It's a task which is staggering. You can't think how it can be done. But it's there. It has to be done. We have to find the means. We have to find the organization to do it.

You see why it is important that we learn more and more about social virtues, social means, as we go ahead. The United Nations, despite all its weakness, is an aspiration towards a unity on the only scale that will eventually count to the local scale. Even people who don't want anything to do with it in the sense of embracing its goals, up until recently have tried to get in.

At the present time China doesn't seem to want to get in if they let her in but that's a passing case. Certainly the ideal of each nation to belong to that United Nations, even though it's in its beginning, and not very effective, it is already powerful enough to be an almost necessary force.

Now those are only some examples and anyone could multiply those examples endlessly. The world is becoming bigger. The world is becoming more complex. The world is becoming more uncontrollable by the minute and we must also by the minute find better means of control, better means of organization to meet this constantly growing task. This need was not felt before.

In the time when the Church in the United States was growing up, so to say, when we were building our schools and our churches, and living almost in a ghetto, without much influence on the nation as a whole, it was quite possible to preach an intense individualism. We still live with the effects of that individualism.

If you wanted to find a sudden concentration of Catholics, if you wanted to get a group of people in the world that has more Catholics than usual, well, look for the groups that are enemies of the United Nations, for example, or look for the John

Birch Society. You'll find that the Catholics are a larger percentage there than they are in the general population, because there was a time when their preservation, their identity, so to say, depended on individualistic action and that still is in their blood.

At the present time, there is no need for that individualistic action. In fact, it's a distinct liability. We must take our regular place in the ordinary institutions of life if we want Christianity to mean anything in those institutions. And now we are gradually undoing the various Catholic technical social, economic institutions we built up in the past — not so much in America, more in Europe — in order to take their place in the regular organizations that embrace the whole of mankind.

Even the encyclicals are extending their audience. I believe Pius XI was the first one who addressed an encyclical not only to the Bishops but to all the Christian people, that was with this one I told you about, the one "On Restructuring the Social Order." Then when John XXIII came along he addressed his not only to all the Christian people but to all men of good will, in other words, everybody in the world, because even the Church can no longer be a separated thing. It has to take its place in the world, this world which is constantly becoming greater and is constantly needing greater influence by Christians if it is to be influenced at all.

Now as a result of all that increasing socialization we have an increased danger of alienation, what we were talking about before with young people. It's not only young people who feel that — they feel it most — but there's this danger of alienation also for adults. There are greater psychological strains nowadays in life.

Sometimes, of course, such a thing is defective when you see that the statistics on a certain disease are increasing, it might mean that there are more incidents of that disease. It might mean that we are discovering more cases that were always there, it might mean that for the first time we are taking care of the thing.

When we notice, as we must notice, that the incidence of psychological difficulties are greater in the modern world that could mean that more people are going nuts. It could also mean that we're giving them more attention so that we catch them sooner and take care of them better. I think it does seem to be both. We are working harder at it, but also there are more people who are in trouble.

Psychological strain comes from this alienation, this feeling that the world is too big, that things are getting out of one's power, that as a result one has no sufficient value, he is not able to carry his role, he is a failure, and so on. That brings on these psychological strains.

At this present moment it's just as fashionable to talk about your psychiatrist as it used to be to talk about your operations. That was the great conversation

formerly, you talked about your operations. Now you talk about your psychiatrist. So it's one example of this danger of alienation, the strain that comes from living in this modern world of ours. What we need is, then, greater control and the control that we need is in these social virtues that we are talking about. We have some other examples.

A few years back there were "the outsiders," the British like that expression, "the outsiders," people who don't belong to this human community, so to say, who are special and who write books about their specialty. Then there are the beatniks, of course, juvenile delinquency, the new breed, the teen culture, as we call it — all of those things are greater or lesser revolts against this tremendous power, if you want, of the organized world around us.

There are other manifestations which are not so normal. It's in this world of ours that such things as Nazism grew up, or the absolutist communism, the absolute state. Those efforts to control life completely are, so to say, deviant manifestations of this necessary effort to control life better. So that such a manifestation as the communist attraction for the whole world would hardly have been possible in the past. People weren't thinking that way. At the present time they can hold out an attraction for everybody, because everybody is feeling the weight of this tremendous socialization of life and in trying to meet that, some people make mistakes.

Then not only is there increasing danger of alienation, there is increasing possibility of achievement. This world of ours is a wonderful place to live in. We can do things that people formerly couldn't even think of. For instance when I came to this first talk I had intended — they told me it would be at 1:00 — to leave Rome at 9:00 in the morning, to get here and give a talk at one. It's presently possible.

Later I made a change. They wanted a talk down in Dayton at 5:00 in the afternoon. All right, I left Rome at 9:30 in the morning and I was in Dayton at 5:00 in the afternoon. You can do that just by buying a ticket now. But fifty years ago you couldn't have thought of it unless you were going to be a saint, bilocation.<sup>4</sup>

The world has changed. We do things now that formerly were simply impossible. When Pope Paul VI came over here to the United Nations practically the whole country watched him on television. It would have been impossible to even think of that before. Now it's normal, ordinary.

Just as you can have spectacular things like that which don't mean too much but which show you how the world has changed, so there are actual things you can do that were impossible formerly. Our effort now to help India feed this famine is an effort which has quite reasonable chances of succeeding. Before this century, it couldn't have succeeded, no matter how much you had tried and how much you had wanted you couldn't have done anything about it.

At the present time, we have the power. We have the surplus. We have the transportation. We have the good will, so to say, which permits it and over there, there are sufficient facilities and transportation which at least come close to meeting the problem. So a problem as big as that, famine in a nation of 400 million, can be met in our day.

Even 25 years ago we couldn't have met it, and go back beyond a century you wouldn't have known enough about it to try to meet it because communications didn't exist well enough. So we are in a world where bigger things are possible. A thing like the United Nations is more possible now than it was before. It's still very difficult, but it's possible. A thing like the Council which we just finished is not only possible but is tremendously successful at the present time. It would have been quite hard to do a thing like that before the age of the airplane, for example.

And so as we see bigger tasks there a little on the periphery of life, we can have bigger tasks on the very center of life. We can hope at the present time to build a Christianity which was not possible before. This Ecumenical Movement — just imagine it if we had done some of the things which we are doing now ten years ago. It's a completely different mentality, and it's possible in our world to have that mentality, to have that different mentality in ten years whereas before you couldn't have had it in ten centuries.

Now there are some efforts to theorize about this different kind of world. And one of the best and most successful is Father Teilhard de Chardin, as well as we know of him. His great contribution has been a theory of evolution on a kind of longer, a broader scale. He felt that the progress of God's creation which you can measure in astronomy and the material world and then in the biological world, and in human affairs, in the intellectual world, that that evolution is finished as far as the basis is concerned.<sup>5</sup>

We're not going to have any new physical evolution or any new biological or intellectual evolution. When he looked at Aristotle almost 2,500 years ago and what we've got now, he didn't see much progress. So he thought that it's not going to be there in a bigger and bigger brain, in a bigger and bigger capacity, that we are going to make further progress — his new evolution will be in the social order, socialization. And in this new field of social effort there will be a growth, a perfection of human nature, as big as the difference of our present intellectual stature and the physical world from which we came.

In other words, as the little poem says, "With the ancestry from which we sprang, I'm glad we sprang." So that's the social world we're talking about. Teilhard de Chardin is correct. That will be the avenue, the highway through which the further progress of creation will take place and through which man will become more the image of God.

There's the answer to the first point in your little outline for today — the very special significance of social charity in our times. Social charity and social justice, the whole complex of the social virtues, are the tools with which we can handle this bigger world and we need these tools to handle this world as much as we need our individual charity and individual justice to handle our personal relations. If we don't have that social charity and social justice, this bigger new world is going to escape from us, it's going to destroy itself and us because it can't be controlled. That's another advance. For the first time human nature can destroy itself utterly and completely. That couldn't be done before; it can be done now.

### **Some Practical Applications of Social Charity**

Now the next thing we have here is what happens even to justice without charity — the case of Karl Marx. We said a little about it yesterday. And then contemporary phenomena involving a deficiency of social charity. Let's do a little bit now by way of application. Let's return to that example we gave of Karl Marx. Remember, we said that this social charity has as its object the image of God in society.

Remember, if Teilhard de Chardin is correct, then any improvement we make in the image of God, any way in which we bring human nature closer to that image, that's going to come not in a bigger brain box. It will come in a better organization of society, and in better human perfection which will come as a result of that organization.

Therefore the acceptance of our society becomes a very important thing. It was always important, but it becomes more important as the society becomes more overpowering. Whenever we cut ourselves off from our society — we luckily can't do it completely and we always still retain something from the society — we're not any more contributing to it.

A good example of that would be, at least from our point of view, De Gaulle's treatment of the Atlantic Alliance. He says he is not going to get out of the Alliance but that he is going to stay in. He likes all those advantages that the Atlantic Alliance gives, but he won't do anything to help it.

The question will have to be, of course, whether he can have those advantages without doing anything to help. We are all like that a little bit about our society. All of us want to keep the alliance. All of us want to have the advantages that come from it, and more or less, all of us will try to get out of the obligations. So that it is important for us now, as educators especially, to get a clear vision of these newer virtues which are only being opened up to us now, and to be able to pass them on to our students.

## **The Case of Karl Marx**

Karl Marx, when he faced his society, he found injustice in it. The Industrial Revolution was just beginning. Men didn't know how to handle it. They didn't have the means even to handle it. They only knew strict line authority; they didn't have any staff authority. Anybody, any personnel officers in their outfit, human relations, personnel officers — those didn't exist, so the only way the man at the top could take care of human needs was to take care of it himself and he was busy making money.

There were tremendous injustices.<sup>6</sup> When Karl Marx saw those injustices he jumped to the conclusion that these new things, the Industrial Revolution and Capitalism as a result, was itself the cause. There was no way of having that without having the injustices. His solution was, therefore, destroy it, tear it down, tear down the society that sustains it, and build a new society a new industry even a new kind of man.

That was Marx's project, and we know that he had quite a bit of influence in the world. The project, however, was doomed to failure from the beginning because it started wrong. Whenever you want to correct an injustice, you must first accept the situation in which that injustice occurs. Once you accept it then you can gradually get rid of it.

There has been a movement in the world which has done exactly that. What we call the Management Revolution now is doing in a constructive way what Marx tried to do in a destructive way. It is trying to see how you can direct the coordinated effort of men while respecting their quality as men.

What Marx missed, then, was not a doctrine of justice. Marx had a very clear idea of justice, certainly we cannot say he didn't have a thirst for justice. The probability is he created more injustice than he corrected. The point is that he was trying to correct it. His failure was in not accepting the society which he wanted to correct, in rejecting it and trying to destroy it before he would do something different. He didn't have that power.

We must first accept our society, then we can change it just as we must accept ourselves before we can make ourselves better. The people who can't accept themselves will never make themselves better. You have to accept yourself just the way you are with a pretty realistic idea of your shortcoming and then say, "Now with this, how far can I go?" But if you say, "I can't be what I am, I must be something different," you are in trouble from the first step.<sup>7</sup>

That's what Marx did in the social order. He destroyed the existing organization of economic life, tried to destroy it, in the supposition that he would then be able in the free field to build something which was worthwhile.

The first thing is that in destroying it he's taking a lot for granted. People who know how to fix a thing, ordinarily don't destroy it first, and the people who want to destroy it probably don't know how to fix it. That's an antecedent thing. If a person doesn't have the ability to correct what is there, what ability can you hope for in creating something entirely new?

It is always a temptation to think that in an entirely new situation you'd be better off, but you'd have to also review the facts. The facts are that those people who want to throw over the society that is there, whether they be Karl Marx of the 19<sup>th</sup> century or the young people of today, the ones who want to throw over the society, are precisely the ones who are not working at it, always.

We must teach the young people and we must teach ourselves that in order to prove to ourselves that we can do something to make our society better we have to be willing to work at the society as it stands. To work at it, you have to accept it. It's very easy if you have this vision of social charity.

In social charity, wherever men are brought together for common good, for common advancement, there is God.<sup>8</sup> That grouping, that working together, that common acceptance of goals and common efforts to reach them, that is in itself something which is an image of God, which should be respected, which should be loved for itself.

People are doing their best, and then after that you can help them. Now really, one of our principal reasons for getting into this matter would be to help the young people we are dealing with. Most of us are educators and perhaps in the course of the discussion we can tackle that problem.

How can we give to the young people who feel alienated, who are outsiders, who are rebels against the whole of the world, how can we give them a sense of belonging to this world? First of all, how can we tell them that they are big enough to live in it and to work with it and lead them to take up their obligations in it? That will do, I guess, for the exposition.

## Fourth Talk: Social Justice, Social Charity and the Council

Now we want to do a little bit of telescoping. Some of the people won't be able to stay tomorrow for the whole time so I was thinking I would start a little bit already of our last topic — social justice and charity and the Council and its follow-up. Then tomorrow we'll have only one talk from 1:30, we'll say, going to about 4:00. That was the people can get away and we'll have covered the ground. The first thing, let's see, a bit of the relationship of this social justice and social charity to the work of the Council and to what is necessary as a follow-up and then we'll continue that tomorrow.

The whole Council itself, of course, is an exercise in social justice and social charity. When you think of it, the task that Pope John proposed to the Church of *aggiornamento*,<sup>1</sup> of bringing itself up to date, so to say, is precisely in our field.

It was a structural change and a structural change that very much took for granted that it worked with what it had. There were no great efforts to denounce the past. There were no condemnations, no recriminations even in fields where recriminations had been the order of the day for centuries.<sup>2</sup>

Suddenly it was out of place to put any blame. Nobody talked about blame; they only talked about what they could do from now on. So you have that burying of all discussion of blame as a perfect example of social charity, of accepting the situation the way it is with all its faults, as the basis for a legitimate effort to do something better.<sup>3</sup> And then the task of restructuring, of *aggiornamento*, that's clearly, if you could see it, a task of social justice, of restructuring the whole organizational aspect, if you want, of the Faith.

Now that, of course, was a very profound change which happened in a very few years and most likely it was the result of a personality. Most things are the result of a single personality who comes at the right time and Pope John seems to have been that. He had himself a certain vision of being a providential person and sometimes he spoke of that.

At any rate he had a lot of fun with the people who elected him, he said that they were trying to get a *papa di pasago*, a pope of transition, and what they got was a *papa de pasedio*, one who ran all over the country. And the changes he brought about were remarkable. We were right in the midst of it there in Rome and

we couldn't believe what was happening, but there it was. And it happened overnight, so to say.

There were two jokes which were current in Rome which were what you call a before and after study. Neither one is very reverent, but no jokes are very reverent. The "before" joke: Just before the Council there was quite a disturbance in the Biblical Institute and the Holy Office. A certain number of professors had a very short tenure and that got into a joke, a rather bitter little joke. One biblical scholar was supposed to have come to Rome and he got off at the railroad station and went out to get a taxi. The taxi came up dutifully and he opened the door and he said, "Do you know the way to the Biblical Institute?" The driver said, "Do I know the way to the Biblical Institute? Hell, man, I used to teach there!" That showed the tenure of the teachers in the Biblical Institute.

The other joke, the "after" joke, also involves the Holy Office a little bit. A representative of the Holy Office was supposed to have been wandering about around the world — you know, seeing how things were and he came back to report. Pope John asked him how things were going. He said, "Oh, terrible, there are threats of war, there's all kind of disunity, there's hatreds where Satan is ..." and the pope said, "Not Satan, the separated angel!"

There you have the two extremes. A place where even biblical scholars had to become taxi drivers because of relentless opposition and a place where even the Devil couldn't be called a devil. That change, those two jokes illustrate something that really happened. From a mentality of condemnation, of resentment, of keeping a distance, overnight you had a mentality of dialogue, of no blame, of trying to work things out together from where we were.

That was very largely the result of the personality of Pope John himself. So the first thing about the topic is that this social charity that took place in the *aggiornamento* of the Church is there right from the beginning. That willingness to accept the world the way it was, without condemnation, without blame, is perhaps the greatest single mark of the change of mentality which made the Council possible and which made it fruitful.

Now that charity was exercised first of all in relation to the institution which is the Church itself. There was a certain amount of lack of contact with the world, the relation of the Church itself with the world, and finally there was a lot of adjustment, changes to be made in the world itself as it was related to the Church and to the Faith. Now those two tasks were undertaken all of them involving acceptance and all of them involving profound changes in structure.

## **The Ecumenical Spirit**

In the Church itself, remember, at the beginning there was a great deal of speculation especially among the Protestants about what this so-called Ecumenical Council would do, whether it would try to work out unity. The assurance that was given at that time was that it would try to revitalize the Church's own image of itself. It would try to become a more perfect Church. In that effort to perfect itself, then you would have the conditions set up that would make the Christian unity possible.

From the beginning the idea was to reform the Church itself, but without condemnation, just reforming the Church itself. Evidently every reform is a kind of condemnation, but no condemnation was ever formulated. Once more a wonderful example of social charity, of accepting institutions the way they are, exactly the way they are, with all their faults in order to make them better.

And the same thing is true of the relations with the world. There were certain aspects of the Church's discipline which were very unpleasant to the world. Notably those aspects were involved in what became the Declaration on Religious Liberty and the attitude towards the non-Catholic. Then we called them sects, now we call them churches. At that time no one would have thought of saying the non-Catholic churches, it was the non-Catholic sects, now we say the non-Catholic churches.

The whole relationship of the Church had to be restudied, so to say. We had to find out what in those relationships were causing more harm than good, were driving people away, instead of attracting them to the Church of God. And finally the world itself as we have seen had gone through tremendous changes and most of those changes required some kind of relationship with the Faith.

There was an attempt not only to reform the Church, to reform its relationships with the world, but also to reform the world. The vast part of the Council, the Pastoral Constitutions on the Church in the Modern World, calls for a great deal of reformation of the world in itself. So we will then try to consider the role of social justice and social charity in the church, in its apostolate and in the world. Now in what way does this effort of acceptance and the call to unity, the call to cohesion, show up in the Council? I'll just give you a few of the things. We could evidently talk about many more, but we won't have time.

## **Ecumenism**

There is the whole question of Ecumenism, of trying to approach the problem of Christian unity from a different standpoint than we had in the past. In the past unity was preserved by safeguarding the rock of Christ from error. In other words,

error was thrown out so that what was left would be pure. I don't suppose there was any former Ecumenical Council that didn't condemn something.

Yet Pope John told the Council from the beginning that there were to be no condemnations, no anathemas. The relationship of the Church to other believers in Christ, believers in God, and eventually non-believers, was to become of mutual respect and mutual worship of God and an effort to help one another in every way possible.

So that's the first thing, this whole movement of Ecumenism and that has had a tremendous effect. I know something about the Ecumenical Movement as it developed in the Protestant field because it began in a field I know something about, the university student field. The Ecumenical Movement in the Protestant Churches began among the university students. Their World Student Christian Federation is not like the Catholic federation, the *Pax Romana*. The Catholic seminaries always tried to withhold their students, not only from hospitals but also from student movements.

The result is that the Catholic Student movements are always without a theological element, except insofar as that can be put in from the outside by the chaplains. The student movement itself is completely devoid of theology. A very great tragedy, but that's not so with the Protestants. They always have had their theological students in the regular student movements and in a certain sense they were predominant.

They were a more serious type of student and they gradually took over the more principal charges. There's the *Ecumenical Review* which has been at the very center of the Ecumenical Movement. That's nothing more than a student paper; that's the monthly of that student federation, World Student Christian Federation and all the leaders of the World Council of Churches were trained in that federation.

So the gradual building up of a desire for Christian unity in a very limited sense, in a very special sense, in the World Council of Churches is the work of a good 40 or 50 years of effort. And just overnight the Catholic Church from being something completely outside that movement became the one movement to which everybody was looking so that at the present time you can't conceive of any Ecumenical movement which is not somehow built around the Church, around Catholic participation.

Before Pope John XXIII, before the Council, no Ecumenical movement ever took into account the Catholic Church. They thought it was immovable, that it couldn't participate. I give that to you as an example of how completely the change came in. The students because of that fact the movement began in the student field, even the Catholic students, were always closer to it than the rest of the

Church so that the difference between the attitudes towards one another before the Council and after it is quite indescribable. We have a complete revolution there.

### **Collegiality of the Bishops**

The collegiality of the bishops is another example of social charity. Of course we know that the collegiality was matter that was past due. Vatican I would have taken it up, but it was stopped by the military invasion of Rome and never closed, so that all they could do was to take the first chapters on the Church which dealt with papal infallibility. We were left with that truncated treatise, so to say, as the only direction and the rest had to be completed.

So the question of collegiality was not entirely a new thing. It was old business, held over, but even so it's profoundly marked by this sense of unity, of oneness, not only in the human race as such, but in the very mission of the Church. There is a willingness to give power to regional councils.

The NCWC, National Catholic Welfare Conference, began as the National Catholic War Council in the First World War. After the war, quite normally, the bishops had thought it was worthwhile, it was good, and they proposed that it be continued as the National Catholic Welfare Council, instead of War Council — keep the same initials and continue a very useful thing.

But that name was not accepted. They had to change it to National Catholic Welfare Conference, a “conference” being something without power whereas a Council would have had power. So from that attitude, see even before the Council you had a difference there.

The SELAM, the Council of Bishops of Latin America was set up with real power, although rather sketchy, even before the Council. During the Council it was clearly indicated that those regional councils should have real power, a clear indication that the collegiality of the bishops would mean something very clear, something very positive. Then the indication of the synod at Rome, all that points to the fact that we have a new vision of the government of the Church by the episcopacy, by the bishops as a whole, the collegiate bishops as a college united with power, but attaining a kind of authority which is quite different from the kind of authority we had been used to, the authority of the Holy Office.

### **Communitarian Liturgy**

Then in the communitarian liturgy. There was a long preparation for the Council, an effort to get a greater incorporation into the liturgy, but the Constitution on the Liturgy thrust the people of God into the active worship in a way that we hardly could have hoped for even before the Council came.<sup>4</sup>

Even the devotion to the Blessed Mother as a chapter on the Church instead of as a separate treatise — there's a feeling there of the unity of the faith, of the organic nature of our relationship to God. This is quite different from the spirit which had made of the devotion to the Blessed Virgin one of the most marked characteristics of Catholic life, but also one of the most individualistic.

If you were ever in a Latin American country at the time when they had a procession of the Virgin you saw something. The men would fight for the front places where you carried the Virgin's statue. They would run alongside and pin dollar bills, pesos, on their statue.

Most of those who were fighting for the front places and who were pinning their pesos were communists. They were politicians who never got into Church otherwise. A completely popular manifestation of some pious emotion, even if it wasn't a faith which meant very much to them but which meant nothing at all to the Church practically because they did not feel themselves as part of the Church.

In this new way of looking at the Blessed Mother in dogmatic union with the Church on earth, with Christ's presence on earth, in relationship with Christ, that will, without taking away any of the devotion we have to her, will, I think, give a much more unified, a much more organic Church in the future. The great popular elements will contribute to the organic vitality of the Church instead of withdrawing.

It's strange how far you can go with that individualistic outlook. I don't know for sure, I've never been able to quite find it out, but I think and I have reasons for thinking that in Rome people still come in after Mass on Sunday and ask for Communion. I think they do. I'm sure they don't go anyplace else for Mass.

No matter how much we try to get everybody in for Mass, there's always one or two who come up after Mass for Communion. Sometimes it's because the confessional has been busy and they got through after Communion but sometimes the confessional is not busy and they still come in some place from outside and ask for communion after Sunday Mass.

In other words, those people have translated even the Blessed Sacrament into a purely individualistic code. They don't like to go to Communion during the Mass because nobody notices. If they go afterwards, they get a lot of attention. I'm rationalizing of course, I'm trying to understand, but I am sure there's something there which I haven't yet solved. These people, rather than go to Communion with everybody else where they aren't seen, come up after Mass and, of course, then a great many of people stay at Mass until the blessing after Communion and I don't think they ever hear Mass.

So it's possible to do that even with the Blessed Sacrament and it's not surprising that they did it with the Blessed Mother. So the effort to bring the Blessed Mother into the organic understanding of the Church itself and to link our devotion to her with our membership in the Church is a good indication of this unifying tendency. It is an indication of the vision of the people of God as a thing which is the object of charity, the object of love, which we want to build, which we want to edify as, St. Paul said in his Epistle, to build up.

### **Cultural Plurality in Mission Work**

Then the insistence on cultural plurality in mission work. You see I'm just speaking of different aspects of the Council and showing how in each one of them you have the same preoccupation to respect the organizations that exist and to strengthen them. A great many people thought that the Blessed Mother was being downgraded and you have a certain amount of resentment even now.

This is not true. There was no downgrading. There was an effort to insert that devotion into the full organic life of the Church.

And so for mission work. In the ordinary course of mission work, without thinking too much, we were exploiting European culture as much as Catholic faith and sometimes more. The missionary went out to work in cultures different from theirs and to take the message of the faith. Quite frequently they took the message which was as much temporal and cultural as it was religious. Quite unconsciously of course.

They took it for granted that whatever they were doing was Christian, that their own cultural forms were Christian forms. Actually we know and know very well that Christianity is not limited to any cultural form. The Council is very strict on that, that the Catholic faith is not limited in any way by culture or to culture.

So the missionary work from now on will certainly try to preserve whatever it finds. Only if that which it finds is completely vicious, is against the law of God, will it try to substitute it.

One of the things that struck me most forcibly was to first see the Cathedral in Nagasaki, the first Catholic cathedral in Japan after the opening. It has been made a national monument by the Japanese government and, of course, being a dutiful person, I went to see this national Christian monument when I went there.

It's the most painful example of pseudo-Gothic you ever saw in your life, translated into this country which has some of the most beautiful temples in the world, the temples of pagan religions. But here is this Christian temple, pseudo-Gothic and rampant pseudo-Gothic, which has unfortunately become a national monument.

It could have been so much better. The new cathedral in Tokyo, by the way, is different. It really tries to become indigenous and with a certain amount of success. So perhaps it's already in the new tendency to accept a culture where it is because we love it, because we accept it, because it is this expression of this people of God, even if they have not found God completely. Taking what is there we can bring God's message to it and transform what is there, not try to substitute it.

### **The End of Jansenism**

And of course the whole treatise on the Church in the world is the end of Jansenism. Jansenism is a thing which has lived very long in the Church, much longer than the word. It was Manichaeism at one time and Abligensiansim, and then Jansenism, and quite frequently it was religious life.

It was a tremendously vital and long-living thing. It could be characterized somewhat along these lines: a depreciation of human nature. In other words, human nature fell, it was the enemy of God. This was a general depreciation of human nature and of its powers, even its power to come to God; a depreciation of the world, considering the world as a place of evil and a place of contamination. It was a place where even if you tried to be there for a good reason, you still had to be on your guard, you had to protect yourself. It was certainly not a place for commitment where you would actually embrace it and give yourself to it.

That whole attitude of other-worldliness, which we call Jansenism, was practically ended by the Council. Instead of having a depreciated human nature, we have the People of God and developed with a great deal of enthusiasm and inspiration. Instead of a world that is to be distrusted, we have one that is to be made, which is our way to God.

The spirit that brought about Jansenism is an admirable spirit, an understanding of our nothingness in relation to God, but it said things the wrong way. We can never say the world is no good for an even simpler reason; it's the only way that we have to God. We can never say that human nature is no good for another very simple reason: God made it.

In changing all of that, we accepting the world as it is. We insist that the world is our way to God, asking of course that it be changed, that it be created, that it be made better. The Council thereby gave us a marvelous example of social charity which Marx so admirably lacked as we saw before.

Marx felt that the only way he could change the world was by destroying it, and starting over. The Council tells us to take the world the way it is, that we must dedicate ourselves to the transformation of it into God's world, starting from where

it is now. There's the whole attitude towards socialization which you have in the Council and which began already under John XXIII.

This attitude accepts this bureaucracy that we see growing up all around us. It accepts the increasing of men. It recognizes the simple fact that socialization permits us to do bigger tasks. Because it permits us to do bigger tasks it is by no means to be condemned, it's to be accepted.

In the past many Christians were intensely individualistic, as I have told you. If you wanted to get a higher proportion of Catholics than you have in the overall population, then seek out some individualist cause like anti-United Nation societies, or the John Birchers, and you would have that proportion. They simply have their own kind of attitude towards social affairs, too much of an individualistic attitude.

At the present time in the Church's acceptance of socialization and attempting to guide it, we have an excellent example of how the Church has embraced organization for itself. It is a way to work out human perfection and, once it has accepted that, to try to make it as Christian as possible.

Those are a few examples only. We could go on for a long time. I picked out the ones that were most obvious, the ones you could see most clearly. Every one of these movements we've been talking about exemplified in one way or another, and usually very vividly, the principles we've been talking about here.

Let's review them once more very briefly. That the doctrine of social charity is that man's organizations, man's common efforts, this unity is an image of God. Pius XI's words are "Man in society mirrors the divine perfections in ways that would not be possible to him when he lives alone." Thus, human society is an image of God which exists nowhere else, and as an image of God it is worthy of love.

How could you do that? Remember, theologians are suspicious of anything being an object of love. The thing is that society is not a thing; society is a coordinated human action. Because it is coordinated human action we can attribute to it personal qualities, among other things, the image of God.

It's only in society that you can have paternity and sonship — which are names of God. In the society of the family we have that as the only place it exists in creation.

The angels can't manage it. But human nature can manage it in society, in the society which we call human love and marriage. Fatherhood and Sonship are names of God, and those names would not be any place else in creation if the human family would be removed from it.

So social charity is to accept our union, our organization of life as an image of God, therefore as a means of going to God, and social justice is precisely that second

one. Once we have accepted our society, once we have stayed with it, then we must try to perfect it.

We gave an example of one who would say of politics — “This politics is too dirty; I won’t have anything to do with it” — he can’t do that. In social charity he must stay with it, and because he stays with it, he must try to make it clean.

The second part is social justice, the first part is social charity. We saw a Scriptural text which is very useful for our purposes, that “When two or three are gathered together in my name there am I in the midst of them.”

That “...there am I” does not mean Christ will come in after you’re there. It means that in being joined together, in that unity, in that community, there is Christ.

Where charity and love are, there is God. The unity itself, the community itself is already an image of God irrespective of the persons that are in it.

You must love the persons too, but you must also love the family, the State, the enterprise in which you make a living, those things must be accepted, must be respected and once accepted and respected, loved. Then we must try to make them better, more fitting to use as instruments of human perfection. So there is a rough outline of some of the aspects of social charity and social justice that the Council touched.

[The End]

## Notes

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### Introductory Talk

<sup>1</sup> Pius XI, *Divini Redemptoris* (“On Atheistic Communism”), 1937.

<sup>2</sup> “29. But God has likewise destined man for civil society according to the dictates of his very nature. In the plan of the Creator, society is a natural means which man can and must use to reach his destined end. Society is for man and not vice versa. This must not be understood in the sense of liberalistic individualism, which subordinates society to the selfish use of the individual; but only in the sense that by means of an organic union with society and by mutual collaboration the attainment of earthly happiness is placed within the reach of all. In a further sense, it is society which affords the opportunities for the development of all the individual and social gifts bestowed on human nature. These natural gifts have a value surpassing the immediate interests of the moment, for in society they reflect the divine perfection, which would not be true were man to live alone. But on final analysis, even in this latter function, society is made for man, that he may recognize this reflection of God’s perfection, and refer it in praise and adoration to the Creator. Only man, the human person, and not society in any form is endowed with reason and a morally free will.”

<sup>3</sup> Father Ferree does not use the expression “object of charity” in the popular sense, but in the philosophical understanding as the “final cause” or “directed object” of an act of charity, not simply the recipient of alms.

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*. Book V, Chapters I and II (1129a-1130b30). Lessius attributes the first use of the term to Aristotle in his *De Justitia et Jure*, Cap. I, Dub. III, 10.

<sup>5</sup> The “common good,” which Saint Thomas warns us not to confuse with common goods (that is, goods, such as public roads and such, that are owned in common), is, ultimately, the capacity to acquire and develop virtue. This capacity is the substance that defines us as human beings. The unclaimed resources of nature, the body of human knowledge that is the common heritage of all mankind, and the institutions of society are all given to humanity or constructed by human effort in order to permit individual men to acquire and develop virtue. Through the acquisition and development of virtue man attains his true end, heaven. It is therefore perfectly proper and in a sense, in the current context, even more correct to say that the common good consists of that network of institutions, the knowledge that is the common heritage of all mankind, and the unclaimed resources of nature. Education gives us access to (turns the common or general into the particular) and the ability to work on the body of knowledge that is the common heritage of all mankind. Private property gives us access to and the ability to work on the unclaimed resources of nature. Social action gives us access to and the ability to work on the institutions of the social order.

<sup>6</sup> Father Ferree did not have the time, given the constraints of the subject (on social charity) and the nature of the presentation itself to develop this explanation further nor emphasize its significance. This specific point, in fact, the substance of his doctoral thesis, *The Act of Social Justice* (1942).

Saint Thomas took the legal justice that Aristotle defined as a general justice and redefined it as a particular justice. This meant that maintaining and caring for the common good was now defined as a “directed” act instead of an indirect “fallout” from the practice of other, individual virtues. Further, and much more significant in moral philosophy, the care of the common good became the individual and personal responsibility of each and every human person, not just the state. Given the principle of subsidiarity, the state in many cases actually takes a secondary role to that of the individual members of society joined together in groups, limiting its role to that of “enabler” or supporter of the “lower” levels of society. Saint Thomas tacitly confirmed this when, in *De Regimine Principum* (“On the Governance of Rulers”) he stated that the people, under certain conditions, had not only the right to rebel, but sometimes the duty. (Chapter VI.)

<sup>7</sup> The following discussion can only be understood by accepting the fact that charity in no way, shape, or form can ever replace or substitute for justice. Charity fulfills justice, it does not eliminate it. Charity is not even possible until the demands of strict justice have been fulfilled. Jesus came to fulfill the Law, not destroy it. Matthew 5:17. “Charity will never be true charity unless it takes justice into constant account.” *Divini Redemptoris*, § 49.

<sup>8</sup> Father Ferree is distinguishing between “loving,” which can be a duty, and “being in love,” which is a wholly emotional and, to a great extent, irrational thing. The former can be commanded (“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, and thy neighbor as thyself”) and dependent upon an act of will. The latter can come and go, seemingly of its own volition.

<sup>9</sup> The formal definition of justice is *suum cuique* — “to each his due.” Father Ferree is here giving social implications of this ancient definition, not a “new” definition.

<sup>10</sup> Development would require change, and change would imply that God is less than perfect.

<sup>11</sup> Our particular being, that is, ourselves as the image of God — not our mental impression or understanding of God from our necessarily imperfect human perspective.

<sup>12</sup> “Rudolf Allers was born in Vienna in 1883, the son of a physician. He attended the Medical School at the University of Vienna and received his M.D. in 1906, a member of the last class taught by Sigmund Freud. From 1908 onwards, Allers specialized in psychiatry, working as an assistant in the clinics for mental diseases at the German University in Prague and then at Munich. In 1913, he became an instructor in psychiatry in the Medical School of the University of Munich, but his teaching activity was interrupted by World War I. His service in the surgeons' corps of the Austrian Army enabled him to perfect several surgical procedures and brought him some decorations. During the difficult two decades from 1918 to 1938, Allers served in the Medical School of the University of Vienna, working first in the department of sense physiology and then (from 1927) in that of psychiatry. After pursuing his philosophical studies at Milan, Allers received the doctoral degree in philosophy there in 1934. Hitler's policies gradually made Allers' situation in Austria unbearable. An American psychiatrist, Francis Braceland, took the initiative in interesting the procurator and rector of the Catholic University of America in the possibility of obtaining Allers for that institution. Fr. Ignatius Smith, O.P., dean of the School of Philosophy brought Allers and his family to America in 1938. After teaching for a decade at Catholic University as a Professor of Psychology in the School of Philosophy, Allers transferred to Georgetown University as a Professor of Philosophy. During his final decade, Allers' achievements received wide recognition. In the spring of 1955, he served as a Fullbright lecturer at the Universities in Paris and Toulouse, Geneva and Vienna. In 1957 he became a professor Emeritus at Georgetown University, and with the aid of a Guggenheim grant he spent the fall term of 1958 in Paris. In 1960 he was awarded an

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honorary LL.D. by Georgetown University. He died on December 18, 1963.” From “The Rudolph Allers Collection, Georgetown University.”

- <sup>13</sup> The three principal societies of man are the domestic (the family), religious (the Church), and civil (the state). Each has a specific role to fill and, to a certain degree, operates by its own special rules, although there is, naturally, in the shape of the human person who belongs to all three, considerable overlap. All the different types listed here by Father Ferree come under these three principal societies.
- <sup>14</sup> That is, there must be some particular virtue that has the “job” of keeping society in good enough shape to allow each of us to acquire and develop virtue and so work on our individual perfection, thereby attaining our true end, heaven.
- <sup>15</sup> *Quadragesimo Anno*, *op. cit.*, § 71.
- <sup>16</sup> Father Ferree’s amusement was, over the next twenty years, to change to frustration as people continued to insist that everything under the sun *except* for restructuring the social order was the point, not only of *Quadragesimo Anno*, but of everything Pius XI wrote and said. As Father Ferree commented in *Forty Years After*, “The term ‘Social Justice’ is used ten times in this encyclical, and there are many other passages where the same idea occurs but without the technical name. Yet very few commentators over the years seem to have realized that *this* is the subject, and the most important point, of the papal teaching. These commentators discuss the living wage, the family wage, property, labor, capitalism, competition, monopoly, class war, Communism, subsidiarity, corporations, *etc.* — all the details that are used for explanation and illustration — but they miss the great subject of the whole encyclical!”
- <sup>17</sup> “It happens all too frequently, however, under the salary system, that individual employers are helpless to ensure justice unless, with a view to its practice, they organize institutions the object of which is to prevent competition incompatible with fair treatment for the workers. Where this is true, it is the duty of contractors and employers to support and promote such necessary organizations as normal instruments enabling them to fulfill their obligations of justice.” § 53.
- <sup>18</sup> That is, the fact of an unjust wage is undeniable — it exists — but it is not directly willed. The individual is therefore not culpable for the evil that results. Willfully paying an unjust wage when paying a just wage would be possible is to pay a “formally” unjust wage, for which one does assume the full guilt.
- <sup>19</sup> Ia IIae q. 1 a. 1.
- <sup>20</sup> In other words, although each human person is endowed or infused with the social virtues as an individual, he can not carry out acts of a social virtue except as a member of a group, a social unit. He is not, in that context, an individual *qua* individual, but an individual *qua* member of a group.
- <sup>21</sup> I think it would be more clear to say three individual things and their respective processes, and an aggregating or directing “over thing.” The individual “things” and their processes are 1) Resources/technology, 2) Knowledge/education, and 3) Individual virtue/individual acts of virtue. All of these operate on the common good indirectly. The fourth element, social virtue, is a kind of *über* element/process (Social virtue/acts of social virtue) that works directly on the common good and coordinates the three types of individual processes into a completed approach to the goal of human perfection. You can’t leave out any single element or its process, or both the individual effort and the common good itself become flawed.
- <sup>22</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, 5.iii. Translated by J. E. C. Welldon, Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books, 1987.

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- <sup>23</sup> Father Ferree makes clear in *The Act of Social Justice* (1942) that Saint Thomas did, in fact, add the necessity of good intent to improve the common good to the practice of legal justice. Unfortunately, most commentators since Saint Thomas assumed that a good intent was *all* that was necessary to Christianize Aristotle's thought. They ignored the more profound implications of Aquinas' teaching. This was that the common good was *directly* accessible by the human person, and that each person could therefore act *directly* on the common good through acts of legal justice. Adam Smith astutely observed, in his discussion on "the invisible hand" in *The Wealth of Nations* (IV.ii.9) and, more clearly, in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (IV.i.10) that a good intent was *not* necessary in order to have a positive and beneficial, if indirect, effect on the common good — but left it at that. Smith removed "good intent" from Aristotle's legal justice, which is what most commentators thought constituted the whole of Saint Thomas' contribution, but did not realize that "good intent" was only one aspect of Aquinas' legal justice. Smith managed to make things worse than they were before by removing at least one incentive toward virtue, affecting the common good positively by acting virtuously as an individual. Some groups even today seem to think that because a neutral or evil act can, ultimately, benefit the common good, that vice (especially greed, rapacity, and selfishness), because it bestows benefits on society, is actually a virtue. Pius XI, on the other hand, realized the implications of what Saint Thomas had done and developed a completed theory of social virtue by making explicit the implication that the human person could act directly on the common good. In Smith's framework an individual vice might by chance have benefits for the great mass of mankind, but in that of Pius XI, directed acts of social virtue would inevitably have better results.
- <sup>24</sup> *Letter to M. Eugene Duthoit of Cardinal Gasparri, July 20, 1929, in L'Action Catholique, p. 223.*
- <sup>25</sup> Contrast this statement of Father Ferree's with the inevitability of Teilhard de Chardin's progress toward the Omega Point.
- <sup>26</sup> That is, not the next encyclical in sequence, but the next encyclical that addressed the issue as its main theme, *i.e.*, not *Non Abbiamo Bisogno* (1931), which addressed specifics of Pius XI's program in Italy, but *Divini Redemptoris* (1937).
- <sup>27</sup> This appears to be the position of Peter Gaskell, *The Manufacturing Population of England. London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1833.* Gaskell was a favorite source for Marx because of his apparent indifference to the plight of the working classes.
- <sup>28</sup> See *The Communist Manifesto* (1848). Marx and Engels give a concise, ten-point program for the destruction of the existing social order, and summarize the whole thing by claiming that the theory of the communists can be summed up in a single sentence, abolition of private property in the means of production. (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto.* London: Penguin Books, 1967, pp. 104 – 105)
- <sup>29</sup> In other words, property. "Property performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones within which the majority has to yield to the owner. Whim, caprice, irrationality and "antisocial" activities are given the protection of law; the owner may do what all or most of his neighbors decry. The Bill of Rights also serves this function, but while the Bill of Rights comes into play only at extraordinary moments of conflict or crisis, property affords day-to-day protection in the ordinary affairs of life. Indeed, in the final analysis the Bill of Rights depends upon the existence of private property. Political rights presuppose that individuals and private groups have the will and the means to act independently. But so long as individuals are motivated largely by self-interest, their well being must first be independent. Civil

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liberties must have a basis in property, or bills of rights will not preserve them .... From the individual's point of view, it is not any particular kind of power but all kinds of power, that are to be feared. This is the lesson of the public interest state. The mere fact that power is derived from the majority does not necessarily make it less oppressive. Liberty is more than the right to do what the majority wants, or to do what is "reasonable." Liberty is the right to defy the majority, and to do what is unreasonable. The great error of the public interest state is that it assumes an identity between the public interest and the interest of the majority. The reform, then has not done away with the importance of private property. More than ever the individual needs to possess, in whatever form, a small but sovereign island of his own." Charles A. Reich, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, "The New Property," 75 *Yale Law Journal*, pp. 733-787, April 1964.

## Second Talk

<sup>1</sup> This is not entirely accurate until the Reformation changed the whole idea of kingship. Previously, the idea of kingship was based on the model used within the Roman Empire, in which a king was an elected or appointed official under the Emperor ruling a specific tribe or people "in the name of the Senate and the People of Rome." A king was not technically viewed as a special breed of man (except for the usual adulation that accompanies the rich and the powerful in any age) until the theory of the divine right of kings was re-instituted after the Reformation. See the analysis of J. B. Bury in *The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians*. London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1927.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, *The Politics*, I.xiii.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, I.iv.

<sup>4</sup> "On Saint Thomas Aquinas" 29<sup>th</sup> June 1923. This was also the encyclical that, echoing Leo XIII's *Aeterni Patris* ("The Study of Scholastic Philosophy"), 4<sup>th</sup> August 1879, specified that the encyclicals were to be read and interpreted in accordance with Thomist philosophy.

<sup>5</sup> "Again, if we are to avoid the errors which are the source and fountain-head of all the miseries of our time, the teaching of Aquinas must be adhered to more religiously than ever. For Thomas refutes the theories propounded by Modernists in every sphere, in philosophy, by protecting, as We have reminded you, the force and power of the human mind and by demonstrating the existence of God by the most cogent arguments; in dogmatic theology, by distinguishing the supernatural from the natural order and explaining the reasons for belief and the dogmas themselves; in theology, by showing that the articles of faith are not based upon mere opinion but upon truth and therefore cannot possibly change; in exegesis, by transmitting the true conception of divine inspiration; in the science of morals, in sociology and law, by laying down sound principles of legal and social, commutative and distributive, justice and explaining the relations between justice and charity; in the theory of asceticism, by his precepts concerning the perfection of the Christian life and his confutation of the enemies of the religious orders in his own day. Lastly, against the much vaunted liberty of the human reason and its independence in regard to God he asserts the rights of primary Truth and the authority over us of the Supreme Master. It is therefore clear why Modernists are so amply justified in fearing no Doctor of the Church so much as Thomas Aquinas." § 27.

<sup>6</sup> That is, the efficient cause of a social virtue is an individual as a member of a group.

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<sup>7</sup> Socialist founder and leader of the Transit Workers union in New York City, 1905 (or 1906, depending on the source) - 1966.

<sup>8</sup> The precursor to the European Union.

<sup>9</sup> To put it another way, individual justice deals with individual goods, social justice deals with the common good, that network of institutions that make up the web of daily life. Or, as Jacques Maritain put it, "There is a correlation between this notion of the *person* as social unit and the notion of the *common good* as the end of the social whole. They imply one another. The common good is common because it is received in persons, each one of whom is as a mirror of the whole. Among the bees, there is a public good, namely, the good functioning of the hive, but not a common good, that is, a good received and communicated. The end of society, therefore, is neither the individual good nor the collection of the individual goods of each of the persons who constitute it. Such a conception would dissolve society as such to the advantage of its parts, and would amount to either a frankly anarchistic conception, or the old disguised anarchistic conception of individualistic materialism in which the whole function of the city is to safeguard the liberty of each; thus giving to the strong full freedom to oppress the weak.

"The end of society is the good of the community, of the social body. But if the good of the social body is not understood to be a common good of *human persons*, just as the social body itself is a whole of human persons, this conception also would lead to other errors of a totalitarian type. The common good of the city is neither the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper good of a whole which, like the species with respect to its individuals or the hive with respect to its bees, relates the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them to itself. It is the good *human* life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their communion to both the whole and the parts into which it flows back and which, in turn, must benefit from it. Unless it would vitiate itself, it implies and requires recognition of the fundamental rights of persons and those of the domestic society in which the persons are more primitively engaged than in the political society. It includes within itself as principal value, the highest access, compatible with the good of the whole, of the persons to their life of person and liberty of expansion, as well as to the communications of generosity consequent upon such expansion. If, as we intend to emphasize later, the common good of the city implies an intrinsic ordination to something which transcends it, it is because it requires, by its very essence and within its proper sphere, communication or redistribution to the persons who constitute society. It presupposes the persons and flows back upon them, and, in this sense, is achieved in them." 49 - 51.

<sup>10</sup> Pius XI, *Discourse to the Ecclesiastical Assistants of the U.C.F.I.*, July 19, 1928. Quoted in Civardi, *Manual of Catholic Action*, New York: Sheed and Ward, 1936, 178.

<sup>11</sup> The few references to the "Better World Movement" seem to hint that it was a precursor to the Parish Renewal effort, concerned largely with turning over as many priestly duties as possible to the laity, and thus not related to genuine Catholic Action, social charity or social justice.

<sup>1</sup> Matthew 18:20. Father Ferree's analysis appears to be consistent with that expressed in the Second Vatican Council's Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy (*Sancrosanctum Concilium*). This document states that there are "levels" of presence of Christ in the Mass. He is present in the assembly gathered to worship as well as other forms of presence, culminating in His physical presence in the Holy Eucharist.

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<sup>2</sup> The following discussion on development seems to have been taken almost verbatim from Father Ferree's treatise, *Introduction to Economic and Social Development*, privately printed in Rome the same year he gave this series of lectures.

<sup>3</sup> Matthew 28:18 – 19.

<sup>4</sup> The property of being in two places at once.

<sup>5</sup> Father Ferree's citation and analysis of the thought of Teilhard de Chardin seems to differ from the more usual interpretation of de Chardin's work. See Wolfgang Smith, *Teilhardism and the New Religion, A Thorough Analysis of the Teachings of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin*. Rockville, Illinois: Tan Books and Publishers, Inc., 1988.

<sup>6</sup> See Peter Gaskell, *The Manufacturing Population of England, Its Moral, Social, and Physical Conditions, and the Changes which Have Arisen from the Use of Steam Machinery; with an Examination of Infant Labour*. London: Baldwin and Cradock, 1833. Gaskell was a favorite source for Marx, particularly because he said so many completely heartless and unnecessary things.

<sup>7</sup> This is another way of stating the essential doctrine of relativism, against which Pius XI expended so much energy.

<sup>8</sup> "Let us note further that, though God is the 'separated common good' of the universe, the intellectual creature is related, primarily as to the object of its beatitude, not to God as the common good of the universe of nature and creation, but to God in the transcendence of his own mystery; to God as Deity, conceptually ineffable, expressible only in the Uncreated Word; to God as common good of the divine Persons and of the souls which have entered by participation into the universe of the Deity. It is only consequentially, because God is the common good of the multitude of beatified creatures which all communicate with Him, that they communicate in His love with one another, *outside of the vision*, by all the created communications of mutual knowledge and mutual charity and common adoration, which flow from the vision; by those exchanges and that celestial conversation, those illuminations and that common praise of God, which render back unto each of them the goods which they have in common. The eminently personal act in which each beholds the divine essence at once transcends their blessed community and provides it with a foundation." Jacques Maritain, *op. cit.*, 23 – 24. In a way, I believe that what Father Ferree is referring to might be the possibility, in a certain sense, of entering into the mythopoeic realm without the strict necessity of the sacraments. This might be done by working to perfect one's one perfection via the institutions of society, or, if they are imperfect, to work to perfect them so as once again to be able to work on one's own perfection. As Maritain and Saint Thomas describe God as the ultimate common good, working to restructure our imperfect human common good in the divine image draws us closer to God and, in that sense, allows God to be present in any social structure.

## Fourth Talk

<sup>1</sup> "Opening a window."

<sup>2</sup> Contrary to popular belief, the Second Vatican Council decided no questions of doctrine or dogma. The Magisterium was left absolutely intact.

<sup>3</sup> The “anathemas” were issued later, by people disappointed that the Council had not changed anything, and who were anxious to modernize the Church, both in the popular sense and in the sense condemned by Saint Pius X. Much of what is currently promoted as being in the “spirit of Vatican II” is, in fact, directly contrary to what is stated in the sixteen Council documents. Ironically, most of the distortions and outright misstatements of fact have been under the aegis of what a great many people call “social justice” without any idea of what social justice consists.

<sup>4</sup> Father Ferree mentions this as an example of the type of changes that were taking place without touching essential teachings. Unfortunately, it seems to have convinced people that change for the sake of change was good, and everything would have to be thrown into a complete state of chaos, with no unity of faith or belief. This would allow the worship of change as change to be installed as a permanent thing.